



SEX, SEXUAL PLEASURE, AND REPRODUCTION: HEALTH
INSURERS DON'T WANT YOU TO DO THOSE
NASTY THINGS
By Hazel Glenn Beh*
"Simply put, having sexual relations is not a medical necessity."'
"The omnipresent process of sex, as it is woven into the whole tex-
ture of our man's or woman's body, is the pattern of all the process
of our life."
2
"[Sex:] The most fun I've ever had without laughing."3
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Kaiser Permanente (Kaiser), the nation's largest HMO,
and Aetna U.S. Healthcare (Aetna) announced that they would not
cover a new drug, Viagra, for treatment of erectile dysfunction under
their standard health insurance policies. The companies cited cost,
demand, and potential for abuse as reasons. Most alarmingly, how-
ever, the insurers reasoned that a drug to treat the ability to have sex-
* Assistant Professor of Law, W.S. Richardson School of Law, University of Ha-
waii. The author thanks the following individuals for thoughtful comments and infor-
mation: Ryan Sanada, Lisa Middleton, Milton Diamond, Louis Swartz, Judy Van
Maasdam, and Tom Baker.
1. Aetna Refuses Coveragefor Impotence Drug, BESr's INs. NEws, June 16, 1998, at 1
(quoting Aetna U.S. Healthcare letter to New York Insurance Department conveying
its decision to deny Viagra claims).
2. JoHN BART=mrr's FAMnIIAR QUOTAIONS, 578 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16' ed. 1992)
(quoting Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), THE NEw SpiRIr).
3. JoHN BARTLEnt's FArmtLAR QuoTATroNs, 767 (Justin Kaplan, ed., 16" ed. 1992)
(quoting Woody Allen, in ANNm HALL (1997)).
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ual intercourse was not a medical necessity, but rather a "quality of
life" drug and its use a "recreational" or "lifestyle" decision.4
Health insurers and managed care providers5 have long resisted
covering matters of sexual and reproductive health. Their decisions
make little sense and are not consistent with the expectations of
insureds.
This article examines health insurer attitudes toward sexual
health, satisfaction, and reproduction by focusing on insurance cover-
age for treatment of erectile dysfunction (impotency), gender
dysphoria (transsexuality), pregnancy, infertility, contraception, and
abortion. The issue of whether to cover treatment for these condi-
tions has long perplexed insurers; the resulting decisions have disap-
pointed consumers. 6 Insurers often focus on the specific medical
condition, the precise treatment sought, and the exact language of
the insurance contract to determine coverage. Unfortunately, in look-
ing at the "trees" of contract clauses and treatment modalities to an-
swer whether a claim is covered, insurers have failed to see the
"forest." Asking broader questions would yield better reasoned policy.
Is treatment of sexual and reproductive health medically necessary?
Should sexual and reproductive health be covered under a health in-
surance contract?7 From a public policy or economic viewpoint, it is
difficult to justify why insurers generally cover treatment for some sex-
ual matters, while declining coverage for others. 8
4. See Letter from SalJ. Uglietta, President, U.S. Healthcare, Inc., Regional Man-
ager, Northeast Region, Aetna U.S. Healthcare, to Frederic L. Bodner, Assistant Dep-
uty Superintendent and Chief, Health Bureau, State of New York Insurance
Department (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Aetna Letter] (on file with author); Kaiser
Permanente Press Release 1 (June 19, 1998) [hereinafter Kaiser Press Release] (on
file with author). Kaiser distinguished "between quality-of-life treatments and those
deemed medically necessary." Id.
5. Collectively referred to as "insurers" unless specifically distinguished in the
text.
6. While I sometimes use "condition," not all of the matters discussed herein are
medical conditions. In particular, contraception and sterilization prevents the condi-
tion of pregnancy, and assisted reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization
do not "treat" the underlying disease processes causing infertility.
7. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 111 (1992) (presenting an economic
theory of sexuality and explaining that the "ends that sex serves" as "procreative, he-
donistic, and sociable."). Judge Posner explains that sex is "volitional human behav-
ior," but sexual desire "is rooted in our biological nature." Id. at 3.
8. See UNEVEN AND UNEQUAL/INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
SERVICES 5-8 (Alan Guttmacher Institute ed. 1994) [hereinafter UNEVEN & UNEQUAL];
RACHEL BENSON GOLD & CORY L. RICHARDS, IMPROVING THE FIT/REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH SERVICES IN MANAGED CARE SErrINGS 12 (1996) ("As would be expected, given
the long-standing tradition of health insurance to cover surgical procedures, surgical
reproductive health care services are well covered in typical insurance policies");
James Trussell, et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 502 (1995) (reporting results of economic study concluding
that covering contraception is cost-effective for insurers and public health providers);
Sally Roberts, Plans More Likely to Cover Abortions Than Contraceptives, 28 Bus. INS., Mar.
1994, at 7, 7.
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Section II of this article discusses the "medicalizaifon" of sex and
the negative socio-medical attitudes toward sexual activity. This sec-
tion also explores how such negativity has infected the insurance con-
tract and why insurers traditionally have not covered matters of sexual
and reproductive health. It concludes with a brief discussion of the
bases on which insurers typically deny claims, including a brief look at
Medicaid and state mandates.
Sections III and IV identify and discuss insurance coverage impli-
cations for six matters of sexual health. Section III examines treat-
ment coverage issues for two matters related to sexual satisfaction:
erectile dysfunction and gender dysphoria. Section IV examines re-
productive health issues: pregnancy, infertility, contraception (revers-
ible and nonreversible), and abortion.
Section V discusses the implications of continued refusal to cover
matters of sexual and reproductive health, and the state and federal
responses to denial of coverage. Insurers are waging a war against
coverage of sexually-related medical conditions based on antiquated
notions, resulting in the failure to deliver the basic sexual and repro-
ductive health coverage insureds expect. By ignoring the fundamen-
tal expectations of consumers, insurers have made themselves
vulnerable to legislatively written insurance contracts. However, be-
cause of the moral and political nature of sexuality, legislation is not a
particularly appealing method of achieving a better insurance con-
tract. For example, women's health may be compromised by legisla-
tive restrictions on reproductive health care choices. Neither insurers
nor insureds should want Congress to write our insurance contracts.
Instead, I argue that it is time for insurers to recognize our sexual
nature and to voluntarily provide rational reproductive and sexual
health care to the same extent insurers cover other common, less po-
litically-charged medical conditions.
Insurers fear that providing coverage for sexual and reproductive
health will result in excessive claims because sexual and reproductive
activity is largely voluntary, its treatment expensive and desirable, and
its demand among insureds very high. However, abundant external
controls exist to curb the various moral hazard risks associated with
sexual and reproductive health coverage. Insurers focus on the moral
hazards of coverage, but fail to recognize that providing basic sexual
and reproductive health care coverage makes good sense.9
II. THE MEDICALIZATION OF SEX AND INSURANCE
COVERAGE
The issue of whether health insurance should cover sexual mat-
ters takes place in the context of a much larger debate over the alloca-
9. See generally Trussell, supra note 8, at 501-02.
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tion and rationing of health care. 10 Two separate questions emerge to
drive the coverage debate: 1) is sex medically necessary?; and 2) is
sexual health a sufficiently high health priority to merit insurance cov-
erage? The following sections examine two impediments to insurance
coverage: the cloak of moral repugnance and the concept of moral
hazard.
A. Sex As Misconduct
While matters concerning sexual health, pleasure, and function
have never been the sole domain of medicine, medicine and science
have assumed an increasingly prominent role in our sexual life.' Bio-
logical science, psychology, and medicine increasingly dominate our
modern understanding of sexuality.' 2 However, before there were sci-
entific answers to explain sexuality, sexual pleasure, and procreation,
10. See, e.g., Norman Daniels &James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed
Care, 28 HASTNGS CTR. REP. 27 (1998); Baruch Brody, Public Goods and Fair Prices:
Balancing Technological Innovation with Social Well-Being, 26 HASNGS CT. RE'. 5
(1996); Sana Loue, An Epidemiological Framework for the Formulation of Health Insurance
Policy, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 523 (1993); Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can
Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow? 140 U. PA. L. RFv.
1755 (1992); Daniel Callahan, Transforming Mortality: Technology and the Allocation of
Resources, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 205 (1991); Norman Daniels, Comment, Technology and
Resource Allocation: Old Problems in New Clothes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1991); Richard
A. Rettig, Arificial Kidneys and Artificial Hearts, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1991); Paul E.
Kalb, M.D., Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private Contractual
Approach, 99 YALE LJ. 1109 (1990).
11. See generally VERN L. BULLOUGH, SCIENCE IN THE BEDROOM/A HISTORY OF SEX
RESEARCH 9-34 (1994) [hereinafter BEDROOM] (tracing the history of sex research
from Greeks to the Nineteenth Century and noting the emerging role of physicians);
RAYMOND A. BELLOTI, GOOD SEX: PERSPECTIVES ON SExUAL ETHICS 13-109 (1993)
(tracing western view of sexuality); DISCOURSES OF SEXUAIIY/FRoM ARISTOTLE TO
AIDS (Donna C. Stanton ed., 1992) [hereinafter DISCOURSES]; POSNER, supra note 7, at
85-111; Leonore Tiefer, The Medicalization of Sexuality: Conceptua4 Normative, and Profes-
sional Issues, 7 ANNALS OF SEX REs. 252, 252-53 (1996).
In the provocative and ground-breaking The History of Sexuality, philosopher
Michel Foucault writes of the modern western medicalization of sexuality:
[T] he sexual domain was no longer accounted for simply by the notions of
error or sin, excess or transgression, but was placed under the rule of the
normal and the pathological ... ; a characteristic of sexual morbidity was
defined for the first time; sex appeared as an extremely unstable pathologi-
cal field: a surface of repercussion for other ailments, but also the focus of
specific nosography, that of instincts, tendencies, images, pleasure, and con-
duct. This implied furthermore that sex would derive its meaning and its
necessity from medical interventions: it would be required by the doctor,
necessary for diagnosis, and effective by nature in the cure. Spoken in the
time, to the proper party, and by the person who was both the bearer of it
and the one responsible for it, the truth healed.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY. AN INTRODUCTION 67 (1978).
12. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 273. Sexology is a complex, multidisciplinary
study involving, among others, the fields of medicine, biology, sociology, history, an-
thropology, psychology, and the humanities, while the twentieth century has been
marked by medical dominance, which is changing. See id.; POSNER, supra note 7, at 13.
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there were "observations, mythology, morals, and magic."'u Now,
however, the answers to our sexual and reproductive problems rest
largely with medicine, pharmacology, surgery, and technology.
Although medical science has assumed more prominence in de-
fining sexual normality and malady,14 morality and moral judgment
also continue to influence sexual behavior.15 The Judeo-Christian tra-
dition has long disapproved of nonprocreative sexual activity, 16 and at
times medical science has joined with religion to dissuade the popu-
lace from engaging in nonprocreative sex.' 7 Various seventeenth and
eighteenth century medical theories, for example, warned that sexual
activity sapped strength and vitality and caused illness, disease, mental
decline, decay, and death.18 In the nineteenth century, medical hos-
tility toward nonprocreative sex led medical practitioners to caution
against sexual pleasure and nonprocreative sex:19
Though it could not be denied that the male received pleasure in
doing his duty to beget children, couples were warned about seek-
ing or prolonging pleasures. This was because, among other things,
there were "undeniable instances where children begotten in the
moment of intoxication remained stupid and idiots during their
whole life."
Women especially had to be careful not to enjoy sex, because they
were maternal, rather than sexual creatures. Only the diseased fe-
male had an "excessive animal passion." 20
13. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 2. "Masters and Johnson offered whole new
areas for the gynecologist, urologist and other medical specialists to extend their serv-
ices." Id. at 196. Posner notes, "[T]he Greeks did not moralize sex; the idea that sexu-
ality is a moral category is invention, not discovery. Neither did they medicalize or
psychologize sex; that was left for the Victorians to do." POSNER, supra note 7, at 24.
14. "Sexual life during the 20th century was ripe for medicalization because of
important social changes affecting sexuality, on the one hand, and people's dearth of
resources and skills for understanding sexuality on the other." Tiefer, supra note 11,
at 272.
15. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 2. There remains a strong moral component
to judgments concerning sexual activity. Consider the condemnation by some of ho-
mosexuality and the view that AIDS is "a judgment from God," or "nature's revenge."
SeeJeffrey Weeks, Values in an Age of Uncertainty, in DIscouRsEs, supra note 11, at 389.
16. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 2-3. "In fact, it was the knowledge of sex that
constituted the original sin that occurred in the Garden of Eden. Augustine, who set
Christian doctrine on this, held that the sin of Adam and Eve is transmitted from
parents to children through the sexual act, which, by virtue of lust that accompanies
it, is inherently sinful." Id. at 3. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 45-50.
17. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 18-33.
18. See id. at 19-20.
19. See id. Writing about sex research in the 19th century in America, Bullough
states, "In the United States, medical practitioners, most of whom thought of them-
selves as Christians, saw as part of their duty the education of the public to realize that
God had designed 'intercourse of the sexes' for the production of offspring and for
no other reason." Id. at 25.
20. Id. at 25 (footnotes and citations omitted). Nineteenth century physicians
believed mental illness and sexual activity were linked. Id. "Sexuality ... became for
1998]
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In the nineteenth century, "the system makers were attempting to use
scientific knowledge to preserve the status quo of traditional attitudes
toward not only sexual issues but sex or gender roles as well." 21
Medical negativity toward sexual activity continued into the early
part of the twentieth century, where the study of sex was dominated by
concern for the various venereal diseases promoted by prostitution
and promiscuity.22 The continued disapproval of nonprocreative sex
led to doomed governmental policies to prevent venereal disease
through abstinence, rather than by providing prophylactics. 23 The
aim of medicine and government in this period was strengthening
American resolve against nonprocreative sexual activity and not con-
ceding our sexual nature.
Medicine and psychiatry have come to define our notions of what
is normal and deviant, normal and inadequate, and normal and
hyper.24 That medicine is a partner in our sexual activity is indisputa-
ble.25 We seek medical attention for care related to pregnancy, infer-
tility, abortion, contraception, and sterilization. In addition, medicine
defines and treats both the physical and psychological aspects of sex-
ual dysfunction, inadequacy, gender identity, and dysphoria.
Although medicine is a partner in the sexual health of Americans,
medicine nevertheless remains, at best, ambivalent about sexual activ-
ity.2 6 Even today, physicians often endorse sexual abstinence over sex-
Freud the indispensable 'organic foundation' for a scientific explanation of mental
disease." Id. at 87 (quoting FRANKJ. SULLOWAY, FREUD, BIOLOGIST OF THE MIND: BE-
YOND T14E PsYcHOANALYric LEGEND 98 (1979)).
21. BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 27. See also Vern Bullough, History and the Under-
standing of Human Sexuality, ANNALS OF SEX RES. 75, 82 (1990).
22. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 92-100.
23. See id. at 107 (describing, for example, failure of World War I policy to pro-
mote abstinence among soldiers as method to reduce venereal disease).
24. See id. at 203-05, 281. Psychiatry plays a key role in defining sexual pathology.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion removed transsexualism as a distinct diagnosis in 1994, in favor of a broader
category of "Gender Identity Disorder" to acknowledge relative degrees and to ac-
knowledge that not all transsexuals suffer emotional confusion and distress. See GI-
ANNA E. ISRAEL & DONALD E. TARVER II, M.D., TRANSGENDER CARE: RECOMMENDED
GUIDELINES, PRACTICAL INFORMATION, & PERSONAL AccouNTS 24-25 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter TRANSCENDER CARE]; Friedemann Pf-fflin, Revision of the Harry Benjamin Standards
of Care in Progress, in GENDER BLENDING, 337 (Bonnie Bullough, et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter GENDER BLENDING]. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders ("DSM-IIIR") eliminated Ego-dystonic homosexuality as a diagnosis. In a care-
fully worded statement, the association noted that the classification had "suggested to
some that homosexuality itself was considered a disorder." DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 426 (3 'd ed. rev. 1987).
25. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 273.
26. See BEDROOM, supra note 11, at 286-87 (describing how in the post 1960s era
there was a decline in scientific research about human sexuality). The AIDS epidemic
renewed interest in federal funding for study of human sexuality. See id. at 288-89.
Moreover, early on in the AIDS crisis organized groups of sex researchers advocated
abstinence as the panacea to AIDS, again revealing disapproval of nonprocreative sex.
See id. Indeed, we are still reminded that we need not act sexually even if we are
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ual activity, 27 despite the fact that sex is an "'essentially important and
pleasurable thing."' 28
B. Moral Hazard and the Tradition of Excluding Coverage for the
Treatment of Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters
This section examines the concept of moral hazard as a source of
insurer reluctance to cover sexual matters. Early health policies ex-
cluded almost all treatment of sexual and reproductive health matters
on the grounds that coverage of these risks was unusual and that the
voluntariness of sexual activity made insurers vulnerable to excessive
claims. Although there has been some improvement, insurers con-
tinue to view sexual and reproductive health coverage as moral
hazards for which insurance is inappropriate.
Despite the increasing medicalization of sex, health insurers have
long balked at providing health coverage for sexual matters. Insurers
have been reluctant to acknowledge that insureds are sexually active
and require medical care to preserve their sexual health.29 For exam-
ple, the 1948 Statement of Principles for Personal Accident and
Health Insurance articulated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners admonished that "[n] o accident or sickness insurance
contract should be issued unless it provides protection against sub-
sexual. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian
and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 137, 179-80 & n.127
(1995) (criticizing current thought holding that even if homosexual orientation is
"immutable," sexual activity is a choice which should be deferred throughout
lifetime).
27. For example, those guiding national health policy still preach against sex
outside of marriage. See Louis W. Sullivan, The Doctor's Rx for America's Troubled Chil-
dren... Strengthen the American Family, 2 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 9 (1992). In 1992,
Dr. Louis Sullivan, while Secretary of Health and Human Services, discussed the de-
partment's goal to strengthen traditional American values including reserving sex un-
til marriage, and wrote, "We have seen very promising results from sex education
using the abstinence approach." Id. Disapproval of nonprocreative, nonmarital sex
continues. See Amy L. Hansen, Establishing Uniformity in HIV-Fear Cases: A Modification
of the Distinct Event Approach, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1251, 1254 & n.14 (1995) (describing
government's initial $1.5 million "America Responds to AIDS" campaign in which the
word "condom" or "sex" could not be mentioned, now replaced by multiple messages
encouraging both condom use and abstinence).
28. Jeffery G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 661, 667 & n.60 (1995) (quoting Kristine Gebbie, President Clinton's AIDS pol-
icy coordinator, and describing political aftermath of her remark in the context of
confronting teen sexuality).
29. A Canadian study reports, "[Twenty-two percent of the] total dollar value of
physicians' services and hospital care used [by females was for] care associated with
conditions specific to women [and three percent of the] total value of physicians' and
hospital care [for males] was associated with conditions specific to men." Cameron
Mustard, et al., Sex Differences in the Use of Health Care Services, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1678, 1680 (1998). The development of a satisfactory pharmacological treatment of
erectile dysfunction will likely increase the male health cost figure. See David R.
Olmos, Kaiser, Citing Cost, Won't Pay for Viagra, LA TnWs, June 20, 1998, at Al (esti-
mating that if covered, the drug will cost the plan $100 million).
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stantial hazards."30 However, the Statement advocated a hands-off,
narrow view rather than advocating broad coverage for sexual health:
Because of the unusual hazard not contemplated by the normal pre-
mium charge, other examples of proper exclusions are diseases con-
tracted during or while in military (land, sea or air) service,
minimum and maximum age limits, and venereal disease. For the
same reason policies of sickness insurance designed for issuance to
female risks may properly exclude loss due to pregnancy, childbirth or mis-
carriage or to disease or derangement of the female generative organs3 1
Ironically, even for a policy insuring substantial hazards, sexual
activity and its outcomes were regarded as "unusual." "It used to be
common for insurers to except from the policy coverage diseases of
'organs not common to both sexes."' 32 Policies therefore excluded
coverage for prostatitis (an inflammation of the prostate),33 fibroid
tumors of the uterus, 3 4 and gonorrhea attacking the genitalia.8 5 Poli-
cies commonly specifically excluded coverage for venereal disease as
well.3 6 Some policies excluded diseases peculiar to female organs in
particular.3 7 Despite the fact that every insured has a sexual identity
and was conceived through a sexual act or a reproductive technology,
insurers continued to find many of the risks associated with sexual
organs outside the "usual hazards" of insurance. Even though approx-
imately half of the population is female, female reproductive health
was often specifically targeted and, even today, continues to be viewed
as outside the common health insurance risks.3 8
Because sexual activity is viewed as largely voluntary, negative,
and controllable conduct, insurers have long viewed coverage of sex-
ual health aspects particular moral hazards to be avoided.3 9 Under-
30. ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE (David McCahan ed. 1954) 331 app. G.
31. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
32. JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 379
(1981).
33. See id. (citing Bartalotte v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 163 N.Y.S. 95 (1917)).
34. See id. (citing Crisman v. Fidelity Health & Acc. Mut. Ins. Co., 95 N.E.2d 776
(Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
35. See id. (citing Hamilton v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 275 N.W. 863
(Neb. 1937)).
36. See id. (citing Coleman v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 145 So. 298 (La. Ct.
App. 1933); American Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nirdlinger, 73 So. 875 (Miss. 1917)).
37. See id. (citing American Health Ins. Corp. v. Newcomb, 91 S.E.2d 447 (Va.
1956)).
38. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 8-12;J. Henry Smith, Meeting Surgical
and Medical Expense, in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE, supra note 30, at 76, 78.
39. Moral hazard exists when the possession of an insurance policy increases the
likelihood of incurring a covered loss, and/or the size of the covered loss. In health
care, moral hazard implies that people use more services when they are insured, or
more fully insured. See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want ,
22 J. HEALTH POLICS POL'Y & L. 383, 412 (1997). See generally Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996) (tracing history and evolution of
moral hazard in insurance).
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writers earlier cautioned of the excessive risks and the moral hazard of
insuring the sexually active:
The most important aspect of moral hazard as a factor in health
insurance underwriting is the probable adverse effect on the atti-
tude of the individual towards contracts and his integrity and good
faith in his dealings with the insurer. Engaging in criminal activi-
ties, gambling, association with criminal or underworld elements,
improper standards of sexual conduct and engaging in illegal occupa-
tions not only involve extra risk to health and life, but also must be
assumed to result in excessive claim costs arising from lack of integ-
rity in dealing with an insurance company.40
Several aspects of moral hazard arise in considering sexuality and
insurance. Insurers try to avoid insuring persons whose character
makes them vulnerable to the temptation of insurance. 41 Older poli-
cies excluding venereal diseases demonstrate the bad character/cov-
erage aspect of moral hazard.42 The aversion persists today as Aetna
reasoned that consumers might-mix Viagra and "poppers" or amyl ni-
trate, and that this conduct is evidence of the "performance enhance-
ment/lifestyle nature of Viagra."43  One senses that the sex-crazed
sinner of yesteryear still threatens insurers and dissuades them from
covering people engaging in sexual activity. Thus, the roots of sexual
health exclusions remain partly grounded in the stigma and disap-
proval associated with sexual activity. 44
Economists view moral hazard not as a concept of "morality" but of minimizing
"incentive" to benefit from insurance. See id. at 270-71. Nevertheless, insurers con-
tinue to view the avoidance of moral hazard as avoiding insureds with bad character
and avoiding the creation of moral hazards through insurance incentives. See id. See
Mamie Mueller, Financing High-Tech Reproductive Medical Expenditures, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'v REv. 113, 115-16 (1995) (discussing moral hazard and adverse selection in as-
sisted reproductive technology coverage).
40. EDWN' L. BARTLESON, ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE: PROVIDED THROUGH INDVID-
UAL PoUCrEs 58 (1963) (emphasis added).
41. Thus, the above passage, alluding to those engaging in sexual misconduct as
a heightened insurance risk, reflects moral hazard's concern for character. See Baker,
supra note 39, at 250 (referring to "people ... whose character suggested that they
were unusually susceptible to the temptation that insurance can create"). "To the
nineteenth-century pantheon of incendiaries, swindlers, itinerants, and the heedless,
twentieth-century insurance writers added delinquents, malingerers, hypochondriacs,
people with bad credit, and those who pursue 'aspirational,' rather than 'medically
necessary,' therapy." Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted).
42. For nineteenth-century insurers, "moral hazard" represented an un-
wholesome mix of bad character and temptation which the insurers had a
responsibility to ferret out from the insurance enterprise. The concept's sig-
nificance lay not in recognition that insurance could have undesirable con-
sequences ... but instead in the claim that the undesirable consequences
could be controlled.
Baker, supra note 39, at 240 (footnotes omitted) (also describing the contemporary
view of moral hazard in insurance).
43. See Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 6-7.
44. Consider Aetna's portrayal of sex-hungry old men seeking enhanced per-
formance with younger women:
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Insurers may also try to avoid creating an incentive that lures
even people of "good character" to engage in covered risks for finan-
cial gain through insurance claims. Therefore, insurers may avoid
over-insuring risks so that insureds will not have an incentive to create
a payoff for themselves. In health care, insurers try not to encourage
overuse of medical services brought about by the existence of insur-
ance coverage. 45 The moral hazard of overuse may explain insurer
reluctance to cover sexual matters such as assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. Insurers fear that desperate infertile couples might over-
utilize assisted reproductive technologies despite low success rates sim-
ply because an insurer is paying the cost.46 Similarly, insurers have
expressed the concern that the existence of insurance coverage will
cause inappropriate and excessive use of Viagra.47
Insurers avoid insuring matters which lie within the control of the
insureds so as not to tempt insureds to create claims.48 In matters of
sexual and reproductive health, the ability of the insured to control
Reports on the explosion of Viagra prescriptions... indicate that it is
being used primarily to boost sexual performance and is not medically nec-
essary ....
Evidence abounds. Dr. Steven Lamm, an internist in Manhattan, took
time away from examining a 52 year-old man who wanted Viagra as "insur-
ance" in his relationship with a 24 year-old woman. "His goal was repeated
orgasms, though he also inquired about a drug to deal with his baldness ....
I can't make these things up." Dr. Lamm also contended that Viagra is tap-
ping a new market; "the vast majority of men who have asked about the drug
have never gone to the doctor and asked about their [alleged] dysfunction
.... What you're seeing is a monumental landmark in the field of sexual
medicine. This is not repair work anymore. I'm a coach now."
Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 2.
45. Discussing the work of Kenneth Arrow, Baker explains the concept as ap-
plied to health insurance:
Arrow addressed the "moral hazard" of insurance, which he explicitly defined as
"the effect of insurance on incentives." Arrow described that effect as occurring when
"the event against which insurance is taken out" lies "in the control of the individual"
who benefits from the insurance. As Arrow explained, individuals may have little con-
trol over illness, but they do have control over which doctor to use, and they may base
that decision upon a doctor's willingness to use more costly medical services. In the
presence of health insurance, this control leads to two potential moral hazard effects:
increased utilization of medical services and increased prices for those services.
Baker, supra note 39, at 267-68 (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare
Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. ECON. REv. 941, 944 (1963)).
46. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 114. "Moral hazard is a real potential concern
in the choice of which reproductive techniques to use. If cost is no constraint, the
infertile couple will want to use the most advanced technology available, even if it is
low yield." Id. at 114. This statement ignores the disincentives inherent in seeking
medical care such as discomfort, pain, fear, loss of privacy, and consumption of time.
47. See Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 5-7. Aetna warns of two types of overuse,
first by men seeking to unnaturally enhance an already healthy sexual ability and by
"heavy usage." See id. at 6-7. "'People with erectile dysfunction will use it to have sex
five times a night.'" Id. at 7 (quoting UCLA urologist Stanley Korenman).
48. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS/THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 335 (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS]
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the occurrence of the insured risk raises a concern that insureds will
engage in the behavior 49 that causes the covered risk.50 For example,
insurers reason that, "[b] ecause pregnancy is desired, and because wo-
men largely control whether and when to become pregnant, the evi-
dent moral hazard makes pregnancy a poor candidate for any form of
insurance."
51
Insurers are probably over-inflating the significance of moral haz-
ard in sexual and reproductive health coverage. It is unlikely that the
existence of insurance is a primary motivation to make certain sexual
and reproductive choices. Many other external considerations, such
as the life-altering consequences of these decisions, the physical and
psychological toll of treatment, as well as the physician's gate-keeper
role, keep demand for health services in check.52
("[W] omen are more likely to choose to become pregnant if they can receive disabil-
ity payments for an outcome they regard as beneficial").
49. The rationale of good and bad behavior is entangled in the avoidance of
insuring volitional behavior. "Insurance cannot soundly cover deliberate acts of the
insured, so suicide and self-inflicted injuries are excluded. For the same reasons, ben-
efits for pregnancy and childbirth are usually quite limited or may be excluded en-
tirely." O.D. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 217 (1968).
50. See Richard A. Epstein, Rationing Access to Medical Care: Some Sober Second
Thoughts, 3 STAN. L. & POL'YREv. 81, 86 (1991). See also Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d
1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding plan's refusal to cover cost of reversing vasec-
tomy); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 611 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. Ct. App.
1981) (refusing to cover reversal of tubal ligation and noting moral hazard of volun-
tary, elective event).
51. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 48, at 329. See also Olmos, supra 29, at Al
("Why should all Kaiser members have to foot the bill so some people can have more
frequent sex?").
52. The physical, psychological and uncompensated economic costs (such as
time away from work) associated with undergoing unnecessary medical procedures
may help curb overutilization. For example, the concern that women will overutilize
maternity benefits ignores other, stronger reasons both to have and not have chil-
dren: The ansver is that parents do not make child care (or pregnancy) decisions on
a purely economic basis. If they did consider economics seriously, most adults, of
course, would forego parenting altogether. See Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting and
Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 61, 68-69 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,
Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2154, 2216 & n.288 (1994) ("Given the minimal level of support through the 12 weeks
of pregnancy leave, the massive costs associated with childrearing in general, and the
entire complex of welfare subsidies already available to women with young children, it
is unlikely that the proposed pregnancy leave benefits will induce significantly altered
behavior."); Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender
Justice, 96 YALE LJ. 914, 929 (1987) (reviewing DAvID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDERJUSTICE
(1986) (disagreeing that voluntariness of pregnancy is a ground for policy of denying
insurance coverage)). Similarly, one can hardly imagine overutilization of sex-reas-
signment surgery, both in light of the rigorous standards and the radical nature of
treatment. See discussion infra Part III.B.
As to abortion choices, research indicates that funding plays little role in deci-
sionmaking. See discussion infra Part IV.C. Likewise, although others suggest that
infertility treatment at the high-tech end may increase with increased coverage, ex-
tracting eggs and hormone treatments seem sufficiently uncomfortable procedures to
prevent overutilization. See infra note 366. Finally, because health care utilization is
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A "patchwork"53 of coverage and exclusions reflecting vestiges of
a Victorian view of sexuality have replaced early health insurance con-
tracts that excluded almost all matters related to sexual activity. While
coverage for treatment of pregnancy 4 and venereal disease5 5 have im-
proved over the last few decades, new issues of coverage for sexual and
reproductive health have emerged such as coverage for contracep-
tion,56 infertility and assisted reproductive technologies,57 gender
dysphoria,58 and sexual dysfunctions.59
Although consumer demand for sexual and reproductive health
care is high, 60 insurers continue to view sexual activity in a negative
light. Aetna, for example, condemned Viagra as a "love drug" or "pas-
sion pill," with the potential to be demanded by a teenager "[who]
desirable while overutilization is not, insurers should develop more precise external
controls (such as utilization review) to prevent overutilization rather than exclusions.
See Baker, supra note 39, at 281; CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 137-40
(1995) [hereinafter CHOICES]; Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF?
Issues and Options, 22J. HEALTH POLITICS POL'Y & L. 1215, 1227 (1997).
Even the demand for Viagra should be self-limiting as it purportedly does not
enhance sexual performance in normally functioning males (and no one questions
the insurers' right to limit quantity). See discussion infra Part III.A. On the other
hand, Aetna contends without any basis that even the potential lethality of Viagra will
not curb its abuse, quoting a urologist stating, "I know a whole lot of men who would
say, 'If I go out in the saddle, that's all right with me, but I want to be riding.'" Aetna
Letter, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Dr. Ira Sharlip (member of impotence guidelines
committee of the American Urological Association)).
53. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 25 (urging transformation of "our
current patchwork into a rational system that effectively finances and promotes good
reproductive health care while addressing the needs and circumstances of women,
men and their families."). The Segal Company reports 100% of HMO's and indem-
nity plans surveyed in 1998 "have some form of exclusion or limitation with respect to
coverage for medication and services related to reproduction and sexual dysfunc-
tion." SEGAL COMPANY, SURVEY OF HEALTH PLAN EXCLUSIONS FOR MEDICATION AND
SERVICES RELATED TO REPRODUCTION AND SEXUAL DYSFUNCTION (1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter SECAL COMPANY].
54. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
55. Most insurers now provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases; however, issues of coverage for routine health screening,
including screening for sexually transmitted diseases remains. See UNEVEN & UNE-
QUAL, supra note 8, at 8.
56. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
57. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
58. See discussion infra Part III.B.
59. See discussion infra Part III.A.
60. A recent study by the Kaiser Family Foundation found 75% of "Americans
believe that insurers should be required to pay for the full range of prescription birth
control products .... [T]he number of Americans who believe Viagra should be
covered hovers just below 50 percent." Should Insurers Cover Contraception? Americans
Say Yes, MED. UTILIZATION MGMT.,June 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10321886 [here-
inafter Contraception]. Another study found that Americans were willing to pay higher
taxes (an average willingness of $32) in order to provide in vitro fertilization services
to infertile couples. See Neumann, supra note 52, at 1224-25 (citing PeterJ. Neumann
& MagnusJohannesson, The Willingness to Pay for In Vitro Fertilization: A Pilot Study Using
Contingent Valuation, 32 MED. CARE 686-99 (1994)).
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want[s] Viagra 'just to have it in his pocket' on a Saturday night."61
Although men and women regularly engage in sexual activity, insurers
continue to believe that the treatment of sexual matters are "unusual
hazard[s] not contemplated by the normal premium charge. '62 Im-
portantly, although insurance may not motivate sexual and reproduc-
tive conduct, when procedures are unaffordable, the absence of
coverage impacts access to health care.63
Women suffer disproportionately when insurers do not cover
matters concerning sex and reproduction. 64 During their childbear-
ing years, women spend substantially more on health care, and have
less insurance, or have less favorable insurance coverage for their
health needs than men.65 Women use thirty percent more health care
resources than men, and the difference is principally related to sex-
specific conditions during the childbearing years.66 Thus, when insur-
ers neglect coverage for sexual and reproductive health matters gen-
erally,67 insurers negatively impact women disproportionately. 68
The disparity is substantial: studies indicate that women's out-of-
pocket health care expenses are approximately sixty-eight percent
more than men, largely due to poor insurance coverage for matters of
61. Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 3.
62. AccI)ENT AND SIcKNESS INSURANcE, supra note 30, at app. G.
63. See Kalb, supra note 10, at 115 (footnotes omitted) ("[T]he rate at which that
technology is utilized depends almost entirely upon whether it is covered by
insurance.").
64. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8 passim. See also Contraception, supra note
60; House Panel Approves Insurance Coverage for Contraceptives, AssOCIATED PRESs POL.
SERV., June 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7424352; Deborah Barfield, Debate Swirls on
Care Equity/Focus in Congress on Contraceptive Payments, NEWSDAY, June 28, 1998, at A26;
Snowe Announces Senate Hearing to Address Inequities Between Men & Women in Prescription
Coverage, GOV'T PRESS RELEASE, July 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7325045.
65. See Susan L. Waysdorf, Fighting For Their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the Histori-
cal Role of United States Law in Shaping Access to Women's Health Care, 84 Ky. L.J. 745, 757
(1996).
66. See Mustard, supra note 29, at 1681-82; Jennifer Haas, The Cost of Being a Wo-
man, 338 NEv ENG. J. MED. 1694, 1694 (1998); Gene Emery, Except for Childbearing
Years, Women's Health Care Costs Equal Men's, Cm. TRm., July 5, 1998, at 8.
67. "[M] ost women in the United States rely on some form of health insurance
to help them defray some of their medical expenses. According to a recent study
conducted by the Women's Research and Education Institute, 67% of women of re-
productive age rely on private, employment-related coverage, obtained through
either their own employer or a family member's employer." UNEVEN & UNEQUAL,
supra note 8, at 4 (citing Women's Research and Education Institute, Women's Health
Insurance Costs and Experience, (Washington D.C. 1994)).
68. See Haas, supra note 66, at 1694. Women's sexual and reproductive health
needs are covered less frequently than men's. See id. A recent survey indicates 93% of
insurers do not cover infertility treatment and 59% do not cover oral contraception.
See SEGAL COMPANY, supra note 53. On the other hand, only 15% do not cover treat-
ment of impotency, including Viagra, and vasectomies. See id.
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sexual and reproductive health.69 However, rather than offer more
coverage to women to correct this disparity, Aetna, in convoluted fash-
ion, recently justified excluding Viagra coverage under the rationale
that two wrongs do make a right. Aetna cloaked its argument in the
constitutional equality of the sexes and the right of privacy:
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and
Planned Parenthood have criticized some plans for covering Viagra
for men, but not paying for women's birth control, because these
plans assist men in engaging in sexual activity, but not women.
Under the penumbra of the Right of Privacy, the right in ques-
tion is the right to procreate. This logically leads to the position that an
insurer need not cover Viagra because procreation, like contraception, is not
a medical necessity.
Thus, Aetna U.S. Healthcare is taking a logical and consistent
approach to coverage of Viagra and contraceptives: Contraceptives
are available through an endorsement to the Prescription Plan
Rider, and our recently filed endorsement treats Viagra and similar
drugs in the same fashion.70
Aetna's position is indeed logical and consistent: neither men nor wo-
men should expect coverage for matters of sexual and reproductive
health.7 1
69. See Sylvia Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L.
REv. 363, 374 (1998) (quoting Women's Research and Education Institute, Women's
Health Insurance Costs and Experiences 2 (1994)).
70. Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 8.
71. Although insurers characterize sexual activity and reproductive choices as
not medically necessary or as lifestyle choices, recently, the United States Supreme
court held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, "Reproduction falls within
the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it
are central to the life process itself." Bragdon v. Abbott, __ U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2196,
2205 (1998). Now that the court has announced that reproduction falls squarely
within the ADA, the insurance coverage landscape may need to change. The ADA
prohibits discrimination by employers providing fringe benefits, even if those fringe
benefits are not administered by the employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(0 (1990). Dis-
ability-based distinctions in health insurance are permissible when the employer can
show the distinction is based on "'underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administer-
ing such risks that are not inconsistent with State law,' and that is not being used as a
'subterfuge' to evade the purposes of the ADA." 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No.
176, at N:2301, N:2302-03 (June 8, 1993). The EEOC position is that employers must
demonstrate that any disability-based distinction (such as non-coverage for specific
medical conditions) is not a subterfuge, by showing, for example, that it is "justified
by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably anticipated experience, and
that conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or experience are treated in the
same fashion." Id. at N:2306. Reproductive and sexual health matters may no longer
be excluded merely because they are of relative low priority. See generally D'Andra
Millsap, Sex, Lies, and Health Insurance: Employer-Provided Health Insurance Coverage of
Abortion and Infertility Services and the ADA, 22 AM.J.L. & MFD. 51 (1996) (arguing that
under ADA and EEOC guidelines employers should not be able to exclude coverage
for infertility and abortion).
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C. The Coverage Game
1. How Insurers Deny Coverage
Insurers generally employ three methods to decline insurance
coverage for certain procedures or for treatment of particular health
matters.72 One method is to limit coverage to "medically necessary"
treatment and to determine that a particular treatment is not "medi-
cally necessary" under the insurance policy.7 3 Clauses defining "medi-
cally necessary" vary; however, these clauses generally require that
treatment be medically "appropriate" with some reference to customs
and standards in the community or within that medical specialty.74
"Medically necessary" does not usually connote a more narrow con-
cept such as "essential," although some courts have interpreted it as
such.7 5 More often, "'[m] edical necessity' is not intended to mean
72. See Frank P.James, The Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool for Silent
Rationing of Health Care?, 12J. LEGAL MED. 359, 359-67 (1991) (describing explicit and
implicit forms of insurer health care rationing).
73. See CHoIcEs, supra note 52, at 125-132 (medical necessity as the "touchstone"
of insurance obligation); Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rationing:
Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1637, 1645-47 (1992);
Norman Daniels, Technology and Resource Allocation: Old Problems in New Clothes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 225, 235 (1991). See generally John A. Glenn, Annotation, What Services,
Equipment, or Supplies are "Medically Necessary"for Purposes of Coverage Under Medical In-
surance, 75 A.L.R.4th 763 (1990 & Supp. 1997).
74. For example, in Schneider v. Wisconsin UFCW Unions & Employers Health Plan,
985 F. Supp. 848, 850 (E.D. Wis. 1997) the plan provided that
"necessary or medically necessary" means only those services, treat-
ments, or supplies.., that are required in the judgment of the Trustees to
identify or treat a Persons illness or injury and which are:
(a) consistent with the symptoms or diagnosis and treatment of the Per-
sons [sic] condition, disease, ailment, or injury;
(b) appropriate according to the standards of good medical practice;
(c) not solely for the convenience of the Person, Physician, or Hospital;
and
(d) the most appropriate which can be safely provided to the person.
See also McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (defining
necessity as a service or supply that must be ordered by a doctor, recognized in the
doctor's profession as safe and effective, is required for diagnosis or treatment, is
employed appropriately in manner and setting consistent with generally accepted
medical standards and is not educational, experimental nor investigational); Alcorn v.
Sterling Chemicals Inc. Med. Benefits Plan for Hourly-Paid Employees, 991 F. Supp.
609, 614 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (defining medically necessary "in terms of generally ac-
cepted medical standards"); Mann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 790 F. Supp. 1145,
1149 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (defining medically necessary: "[tlo be 'needed' a service must
be (a) ordered by a doctor, (b) commonly and customarily recognized throughout
the doctors' profession as appropriate in the treatment or diagnosis of the sickness or
injury, (c) neither educational nor experimental in nature .... and (d) neither fur-
nished mainly for the purpose of medical nor other research").
75. See Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. 1987) (in-
terpreting medically necessary as "essential" and finding in vitro is not essential);
Lockshin v. Blue Cross of N.E. Ohio, 434 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ohio App. 1980) (inter-
preting medically necessary as "required," "compulsory," "essential," "indispensable,"
or "unavoidable," and holding private nurse was not necessary). Compare with Aberna-
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life-or-death necessity, but merely medically appropriate or medically
beneficial. '76 Generally, the insurer plays a key role in determining or
establishing the process by which medical necessity is determined, and
the physician's order alone does not establish necessity for coverage
purposes.77
When a policy contains no exclusions, courts typically, but not
uniformly, view the treatment of sexual diseases or dysfunction as
medically necessary. 78 Nevertheless, insurers persistently argue with
some success that treatment of sexual and reproductive disorders is
elective, cosmetic, 79 or unnecessary.80 Aetna's and Kaiser's conten-
tion that sexual relations are not medically necessary but involve a
quality of life choice8' is a predictable insurers' position.
A second method of declining coverage is to determine whether
the proposed treatment is experimental under a standard exclusion of
coverage for experimental treatments.82 In theory, the experimental-
treatment exclusion serves both cost and public policy interests.83 Af-
ter all, individual insureds are not well-served when subjected to un-
proven and potentially worthless treatments, and insurance
consumers are generally harmed by paying higher premiums to cover
unproven treatments.84 The battle ground in these disputes is
whether a treatment has moved beyond the experimental label toward
medical community acceptance. 85
thy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 264 S.E.2d 836, 837-38 (S.C. 1980) ("medically nec-
essary" as "appropriate" and covering depilatory treatment to remove excess facial
hair). See also CHOICES, supra note 52, at 128 (noting a few plans employ the term
.essential").
76. Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1646 n.27 (citing Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 574 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
77. The early policies provided no such limitation and generally covered all care
ordered by a physician. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1644-45. Questionable
or excessive demands for coverage and judicial deference to physician orders
prompted insurers to insert the clause. See id. See also CHOICES, supra note 52, at 130-
31.
78. See, e.g., Doe v. Northwestern, 355 S.E.2d 867 (S.C. 1987) (covering cost of
penile prosthesis to treat symptoms of diabetic-caused impotency); Davidson v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1979) (holding sex-change is not cosmetic
surgery).
79. See Robertson v. NN. Investors Life Ins. Co., 385 S.E.2d 681, 681 (Ga. Ct
App. 1989) (penile implant constituted cosmetic surgery); Davidson, 420 N.Y.S.2d at
451 (sex-change is cosmetic surgery).
80. See Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. 1987) (in
vitro fertilization will not "cure" the disease of infertility).
81. SeeAetna Letter, supra note 4, at 3. See also Kaiser Press Release, supra note 4,
at 1.
82. See CHOICES, supra note 52, at 132; Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1640 &
n.13 (gathering articles on the experimental treatment clause exclusion); James,
supra note 72, at 366; Kalb, supra note 10, at 1111.
83. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1677-81; Kalb, supra note 10, at 1112.
84. SeeJames, supra note 72, at 386 (citing Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 684
F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982)).
85. SeeJames, supra note 72, at 377-85.
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The insurance contract often defines experimental8 6 as being ac-
cepted in the medical community and having been subjected to evalu-
ation by some form of clinical review.8 7 Assisted reproductive
technologies and sex-reassignment surgery are typically attacked as ex-
perimental by insurers, while insureds argue they are standard treat-
ments.8 8 In the pharmaceutical arena, once drugs are approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for particular indications,
the drugs are not regarded as experimental for that use; however, in-
surers may still deny coverage for "off-label" uses.8 9
A third method insurers use to decline coverage is to specifically
exclude coverage for particular diseases or treatments. 9 0 Most nota-
bly, express exclusions or limited coverages exist for cosmetic surgery,
preexisting conditions, and mental illness;91 many other specific pro-
cedures, treatments, or diseases are excluded in policies as well. Ex-
clusions often seem random; "one senses that their listing may reflect
some past controversy in which the plan found itself embroiled and
that coverage of many of these services could be denied by another
plan under more general language. '92
Employing express exclusions poses multiple problems. First, ex-
press exclusions are "clumsy rationing tools in the same way that meat
axes are inferior to scalpels in doing surgery. Some highly beneficial
services in the excluded categories are inevitably excised from cover-
age, while some very questionable services continue to be financed
because contract language is not precise enough to exclude them."93
In addition, express exclusions cannot keep pace with new medical
developments; therefore insurers may find it difficult to draft clauses
that exclude coverage as broadly as they desire. 94 Moreover, exclusion
clauses are plagued by judicial inconsistencies that afford little cer-
86. See id. at 367 (citing an example of how insurance carrier derived its defini-
tion of radial ketatotomy).
87. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1654. See, e.g., Stringfield v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 732 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 806 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1992).
88. See infra Part IV and supra Part III.B.
89. An "off-label use of a prescription drug is a use not included in the FDA
approved indications." See Drusilla S. Raiford, et al., Determining Appropriate Reimburse-
ment for Prescription Drugs: Off Label Uses and Investigational Therapies, 49 FOOD & DRUG
LJ. 37, at 38 (1994); Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 9.
90. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1684; CHOICES supra note 52, at 141;
Havighurst, supra note 10, at 1774.
91. See Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for
MentalIllness: New Law orMerely Good Intentions7, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 63, 70-73 (1997);
Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing with Our Minds: The Mental Illness Limitation in
Health Insurance, 50 MIAIu L. REV. 345, 346-47 (1996).
92. CHOICES, supra note 52, at 141.
93. Havighurst, supra note 10, at 1774. See also Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at
1684 (noting difficulty of drafting clauses with precision and free of ambiguity).
94. See Mark A. Hall, et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empir-
ical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1063 & n.12
(1996).
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tainty to insurers attempting to use exclusions to fix their costs and
risks.95
Insurers sometimes justify exclusions on the grounds that certain
diseases and treatments involve "diagnostic ambiguity," "elastic inter-
ventions," or "vague end points. '96 When the diagnosis or treatment
is vague and subjective, insurers fear that they will have no means by
which to check excessive utilization.97 Plans denying coverage for
Viagra recently cited these reasons, complaining the diagnosis of im-
potency was too subjective and that mass-marketing artificially in-
creased consumer demand for the drug.98
Insurers also justify exclusions on the grounds that the proce-
dures are too expensive in comparison to success or medical necessity.
For example, sex-reassignment surgery is viewed as too costly in light
of its perceived purpose; in vitro fertilization is viewed as too costly in
light of its poor success rate; and reversal of voluntary sterilization is
not medically necessary in light of its voluntariness. 99
2. Medicaid Coverage Determinations
Government-funded programs pay a substantial portion of health
care bills.100 While Medicaid methods of making determinations re-
garding coverage is similar to private plans, its methods are not identi-
cal. Medicaid010 is a cooperative 0 2 state and federal program which
95. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1684 (citing Lee N. Newcomer, Defin-
ing Experimental Therapy-A Third Party Payer's Dilemma, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1702
(1990)).
96. Cook, supra note 91, at 346 & n.6 (citing Barry Blackwell, No Margin, No Mis-
sion, 271 JAMA 1466 (1994)); Shannon, supra note 91, at 69-70. See also Aetna Letter,
supra note 4, at 3-5 (complaining that diagnosis is too difficult, especially fueled by the
manufacturer feeding excessive fears of normal males).
97. See Cook, supra note 91, at 346. Physicians can play an important role as a
gatekeeper. See Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
693, 703-05 (1994) (discussing potential role of physician in health care rationing
decisions); Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1666-68 (discussing limitations on ef-
fectiveness of the physician as gatekeeper); Baker, supra note 39, at 267-69 (discussing
physician's role in utilization in context of moral hazard).
98. See Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 3-5; Kaiser Press Release, supra note 4, at 1
(identifying the issue that mass marketing raises demand).
99. See CHoIcEs, supra note 52, at 141 & n.19 (referring to these as "items of low
priority (both as health needs and candidates for insurance coverage) compared with
covered services")).
100. Insurers pay approximately 30% of health care costs, the federal and state
governments (insurance for the aged, disabled and indigent) pay approximately 40%
and individuals, charities and self-insured corporations pay approximately 30%. See
Kalb, supra note 10, at 1111 (citing DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICEs,
HEALTH UNITED STATES 160 (1988)).
101. See Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u (1994).
102. Medicaid is an example of "cooperative federalism" in which gives the states
latitude to design and implement a program using federal funds and guidelines. See
Lisa B. Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Organ Transplants: The Extent of Mandated Cover-
age, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 185, 187; C. David Flower, Note, State Discretion in
Funding Organ Transplants Under the Medicaid Program: Interpretive Guidelines in Determin-
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provides medical assistance to indigent and disabled persons.'03
Although voluntary, if a state chooses to participate in the Medicaid
program, it must comply with federal statutory and regulatory man-
dates.10 4 Although not an insurance contract, coverage issues under
Medicaid are similar in that a state may limit health care coverage to
those procedures that are "medically necessary"'1 5 and not "experi-
mental" or "medically inappropriate."'1 6 While a state has discretion
in establishing and designing its Medicaid program, including cover-
age, a state "may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration,
or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible recipient
solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition."'01 7 More-
over, while a state may place "appropriate limits" on services, 08 the
state must promulgate standards that are consistent with the objectives
of the Medicaid Act.10 9
As to pharmaceuticals, state Medicaid programs generally must
pay for any use of a "covered outpatient drug" that is either approved
by the FDA or is generally accepted or appropriate." 0 The new de-
bate as to whether states can elect not to cover Viagra marks a colli-
sion between concepts of "medically necessary" treatments and
coverage for FDA-approved drugs prescribed by a physician."'
3. State and Federal Mandates: A Less Than Effective Means
Around the Insurance Contract
In recent years, consumers have attempted to use the legislative
process to sidestep coverage disagreements with insurers and to frus-
ing the Scope of Mandated Coverage 79 MN. L. REv. 1233, 1236 & n.12 (1995); Anna
Wermuth, Comment, Kidcare and the Uninsured Child: Options for an Illinois Health Insur-
ance, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 472 & n.60 (1998) (citing Colleen A. Foley, The Doctor
Will See You Now: Medicaid Managed Care and Indigent Children, 21 SETON HALL LGIS J.
at 93-94 (1997)).
103. See Flower, supra note 102, at 1236.
104. SeeAlexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 & n.1 (1985); Weaver v. Reagen,
886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989).
105. Flower, supra note 102, at 1241; Wermuth, supra note 102, at 474-83;
Deutsch, supra note 102, at 187-89.
106. Deutsch, supra note 102, at 187-88.
107. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1997).
108. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1997). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (1994).
109. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443-45 (1977); Weaver, 886 F.2d at 198; Flower,
supra note 102, at 1242; MaxwellJ. Mehlman, The Oregon Medicaid Program: Is it Just?, 1
HEALTH MATrmx 175, 179-80 (1991). Recently, the Second Circuit discussed the
breadth of the state's latitude in designing and limiting coverage and held that a state
could set limits on coverage even though particular services were medically necessary
for an individual. See DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 92 (2d Cir. 1998), petition for
cert. filed, _ U.S. - (1998) (No. 98-5070). Broadly ruling for state flexibility, the
Second Circuit stated, "There is no requirement that a state fund every medically
necessary procedure or item falling within a service it covers under its plan." Id.
110. See Raiford, supra note 89, at 39 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
111. See infra note 173.
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trate insurers relying on contract language to exclude consumer-de-
sired treatments. 112 State mandates 1 3 for specific health care
coverage are numerous." 4 Critics argue that insurance policies that
are legislatively created through state mandates raise premiums, re-
duce consumer choice, disproportionately concentrate health care re-
sources on particular health problems, and eventually increase the
number of uninsured individuals. 115 The politically charged nature of
sexual and reproductive choices makes matters of sexual and repro-
ductive health ripe for legislative action to both broaden and limit
coverage. 116 Thus, legislation regarding sexual and reproductive
health may just as easily eroded as protect sexual health.
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) gov-
erns and regulates employee welfare benefit plans established and
maintained by employers or employee organizations. 1 7 ERISA's im-
pact on health insurance cannot be underestimated because the ma-
jority of Americans are covered under ERISA plans."a 8 ERISA
contains a preemption clause which dilutes the ability of states to
mandate specific insurance coverage insured under some ERISA
plans." 9
112. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 73, at 1684.
113. "State mandated benefits are laws that prescribe the terms of coverage for
group insurance purchased from [Blue Cross/Blue Shield] and commercial insurers.
Such laws include requirements that plans cover specific services, categories of provid-
ers, diseases, or persons who might otherwise have difficulty obtaining coverage."
Gail A. Jensen, State Insurance Regulation and Employers' Decisions to Self-Insure, J. RISK &
INs. 185, June 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 12368804. Some mandates require only
that insurers "offer" the option to purchase coverage. See Neumann, supra note 52, at
1218-20 (surveying states with mandates to cover or mandates to offer and impact);
Melissa R. O'Rourke, The Status of Infertility Treatments and Insurance Coverage: Some
Hopes and Frustrations, 37 S.D. L. REv. 343, 366 (1992); William C. Cole, Infertility: A
Survey of the Law and Analysis of the Need for Legislation Mandating Insurance Coverage, 27
SAN. DIEGO L. REv. 715, 724 (1990); Christine A. McAteer, Health Care Mandates: The
Delivery Debate, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1691, 1694-98 (1996) (discussing the merits of
48 hour minimum in-hospital care for mothers and newborns).
114. "Between 1980 and 1990, the number of state mandates (in place across all
the states) almost doubled, from 450 to 854." Jensen, supra note 113, at 187 (citing
MANDATED BENEFITS MANUAL (1992)).
115. See Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 2092, 2099-2100 (1996) (describing the pros and cons of state mandates).
116. See infra notes 346-350 and accompanying text.
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
118. See Millsap, supra note 71, at 51, 54 n.26 (collecting reported statistics). The
Health Insurance Association of America indicates that 32% of small employers, 85%
of large employers (25 employees or more) offer health benefits, and 77% of employ-
ees work in firms making health benefits available. SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE DATA 26 (Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. ed. 1992) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; see also
MARK V. PAULY, PH.D., HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK 78-79 (1997) (noting increasing
availability of employer-offered health insurance and that approximately 59% of work-
ers take insurance coverage through their employment).
119. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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The federal ERISA law expressly preempts state laws that conflict
with the federal regulation of employee welfare benefit plans. 120 A
savings clause within ERISA exempts state laws regulating insur-
ance;' 21 however, ERISA provides that an employee benefit plan is not
deemed to be an insurance company or engaged in the business of
insurance. 122 Therefore, employers who "self-fund" or "self-insure"
their employee welfare benefit plans may escape the obligation insur-
ers have to comply with state insurance mandates. 123 Thus, the more
onerous state mandates become, the more attractive self-insuring
health plans become to employers who are able to self-insure.124 As
self-funded plans increase, state mandates will affect fewer health
plans.
While free from state mandates, self-insured employee welfare
benefit plans and other ERISA plans do not escape the requirements
of federal mandates. Consequently, the mandates found in federal
acts such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,125 the
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1995,126 and the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1997127 are applicable even to ERISA self-
insured health plans. 128 Thus, despite state law's traditional role in
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B).
123. See Loue, supra note 10, at 535; see also Laura J. Schacht, Note, The Health
Care Crisis: Improving Accessfor Employees Covered by Self-Insured Health Plans Under ERISA
and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEmp. L. 303, 311
(1994); SouacE Booy, supra note 118, at 3-4. The self-insured fund also avoids cer-
tain state tax consequences and earns interest on its reserves, additional factors which
make self-insuring attractive. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 119 n.12; see alsoJensen,
supra note 113; Cole, supra note 113, at 731-33.
124. See Schacht, supra note 123, at 305, 310-14 (64% of all employers self-in-
sure). These self-insured plans often contract to purchase administrative services
through commercial insurers. See id. at 311 n.30; see alsoJensen, supra note 113, at 185
(noting that self-insuring employers in the 1980s, "became the leading underwriters
of all group coverage in the United States, accounting for 58 percent of all group
health premiums by the close of the decade"); Dwight McNeill, Accountability Begins
With You, 15 Bus. & HEALTH 51, Dec. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9588701; SoUtcE
Boor, supra note 118, at 4 (noting growth of self-insurance).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4 , 300gg-41 (Supp. 1996); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp.
1996).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (Supp. 1996); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. 1996).
128. See Diane West, New Mandates, ERISA Butt Heads, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP.
& CAS./RMSK & BEI,,rrrs MGrvrr., May 1998, at 33.
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regulating insurance, 129 new mandates will likely be proposed at the
federal level in order to reach self-insured employee benefit plans. 130
III. SEXUAL SATISFACTION, PERFORMANCE, AND DYSFUNCTION
A. Impotency
1. Viagra: A Magic Pill At Last
The prevalence of sexual dysfunction among American males is
substantial,' 3 ' but until recently, treatment options were few and
unappealing.1 3 2 In March 1998, the FDA approval of an important
new drug, sildenafil, 133 for the treatment of erectile dysfunction raised
new insurance issues concerning the medical necessity of treatment
for sexual dysfunction generally.' 34
Erectile dysfunction, "the persistent inability to achieve or main-
tain an erection sufficient for satisfactory sexual performance, is esti-
129. The McCarran-Ferguson Act generally reserves to the states the regulation
of the business of insurance. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). On the other hand,
the Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state law in
the area of employee benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974). The interplay of the
two preemption statutes is "one of the knottiest problems of statutory interpretation
imaginable." ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 75 (2d ed. 1996).
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985), the Court held
that an insurance company providing ERISA governed benefits was not exempt from
a state mandate requiring mental health benefits to insureds; however, the Court
noted that an uninsured or self-insured plan would enjoy preemption because these
plans did not involve the business of insurance.
130. See proposed laws cited infra note 317.
131. In a study of men between the ages of 40 and 70, 52% reported minimal,
moderate, or complete impotence. See Henry A. Feldman, et al., Impotence and its
Medical and Psychosocial Correlates: Results of the Massachusetts Male Aging Study, 151 J.
UROLOGY 54, 55 (1994). Although this section will focus principally on treatment for
impotency, both men and women report a variety of sexual dysfunctions. In a 1978
study of well-educated, happily-married couples, with a median age of 35 for females
and 37 for males, 40% of males reported erectile or ejaculatory dysfunction, and 63%
of the women reported arousal or orgasmic dysfunction. See Ellen Frank, et al., Fre-
quency of Sexual Dysfunction in "Normal" Couples, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 111, 111-15
(1978).
132. See infra notes 164-86.
133. According to Pfizer, Viagra (sildenafil citrate) is an oral therapy for erectile
dysfunction. See Pfizer, Viagra, The FDA Approved Impotence Pill, (visited Oct. 18, 1998)
<http://nvw.viagra.com/hcp/prodinfotemp.html>. "The physiologic mechanism
of erection of the penis involves release of nitric oxide (NO) in the corpus
cavemosum during sexual stimulation ... ." Id. Sildenafil "enhances the effect of
nitric oxide .... " Id. Pfizer reports that "[slildenafil at recommended doses has no
effect in the absence of sexual stimulation." Id.
134. See generally Robert D. Utiger, A Pill for Impotence, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1458, 1459 (May 14, 1998); IMPOTENCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH CONSENSUS
STATEMENT ONLINE 1992 (Dec. 7-9, 1992) (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://text.nlm.nih.
cdc/www.nih.gov> [hereinafter CONSENSUS]. The NIH Consensus Development Con-
ference on Impotence recommended replacing the term impotence with "erectile
dysfunction." See id.
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mated to affect up to thirty million men in the United States. ' 135 In a
national study, erectile dysfunction "accounted for 400,000 outpatient
visits to physicians and 30,000 hospital admissions, resulting in total
direct costs of $146 million" before Viagra's approval. 136 Projected
annual Viagra sales range from $1 billion 3 7 to $4.5 billion 3 8 to as
much as $8 billion.139 Demand for Viagra prescriptions will likely re-
sult in a dramatic increase in doctor visits as well.140 Aetna projected
that the increased costs of covering Viagra and resulting higher insur-
ance premiums could leave 400,000 to 800,000 more individuals
uninsured.' 41
The causes of erectile dysfunction are multifactorial and broadly
classified as organic or psychological.' 42 Erectile dysfunction may be a
symptom of many underlying diseases and conditions, including,
among others, diabetes mellitus, endocrinological conditions, hyper-
tension, vascular disease, alcoholism, and depression. 43 Even after
accounting for illness, medication, and psychopathology, advanced
age also contributes to diminished sexual performance. However, sex-
ual activity typically continues into old age. 144 Total or partial erectile
dysfunction affects fifty-seven percent of men over the age of seventy,
135. Irwin Goldstein, et al., Oral Sildenafil in the Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction,
338 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1397, 1397 (1998); see also CONSENSUS, supra note 134, (10-20
million diagnosed with erectile dysfunction increases to 30 million when a category
for partial dysfunction is added).
136. See Feldman, supra note 131, at 54 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STArISTIcs: DETAILED DIAGNOSES AND PROCEDURES FOR PATIENTS DISCHARGED FROM
SHORT-STAY HosPrrALs: UNITED STATES, 1985 (Vital and Health Statistics, series 13, No.
90, U.S. DEP'T. OF H.ALTH AND HuN SERV. PUB. No. PHS 87-1851 (1987)).
137. See Michelle Fay Cortez, Fatalities Cast Shadows Over Sales of a Sex Drug, J. REc.
(Okla. City), May 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11954223. Kaiser estimated that "na-
tional coverage of the pill would cost at least $100 million a year, even if users were
limited to 10 pills a month." Larry D. Hatfield, Kaiser Refuses to Cover Viagra, S.F.
ExAm'R, June 19, 1998, at Al.
138. See David Stipp & Robert Whitaker, The Selling of Impotence, FORTUNE, Mar.
16, 1998, at 115, 116; Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 11 (estimating national sales of
Viagra at $5 billion and prescription coverage for its insureds at $50 million (exclud-
ing other medical costs)).
139. See Geoffrey Cowley, Is Sex A Necessity2, NEVSWEEK, May 11, 1998, at 62 (as-
suming half of the estimated 30 million men affected take Viagra once a week).
140. See Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 11.
141. See id.
142. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134.
143. Additional NIH risk factors include: high levels of blood cholesterol, low
levels of high density lipoprotein, drug use, neurogenic disorders, Peyronie's disease,
priapism, lack of sexual knowledge, poor technique, inadequate interpersonal rela-
tionships, chronic diseases including renal failure, and prior vascular surgery. Other
risk factors may include advancing age and smoking. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134;
see also Feldman, supra note 131, at 55-59.
144. See Raul C. Schiavi, Sexuality and Aging in Men, ANN. REV. OF SEX RES. 227,
244 (1990). Nevertheless, total or partial impotence ("the inability to achieve and
maintain vaginal penetration until orgasm on at least 50% of the attempts during the
preceding 6 months") remains a distinct dysfunction. Id. at 243.
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in contrast to the seven percent of men between the ages of twenty
and thirty.145
Viagra is the first effective oral therapy available for the treatment
of erectile dysfunction, 146 although at least one other drug may soon
be approved. 147 Prior to Viagra's much-heralded approval, other oral
treatments were largely ineffective. 148 Alternative medicines of lim-
ited or questionable success have included herbal remedies 149 and
symbolic remedies, such as rhinoceros horns and other natural ob-
jects shaped like the erect penis. 50 Oral hormones have also proven
unsuccessful. 151 The quest for a cure has been relentless and ageless:
"hundreds of bizarre remedies, from boar gall to tiger-penis soup,
have won believers through the ages - desperate males are easily
fooled by placebo effects which can temporarily ameliorate mild im-
potence. A century ago men even mail-ordered electrified jockstraps
in hopes of jump-starting their inoperative parts." 5 2 Drug studies in
the past decade reported small success following clinical trials with
numerous other drugs.153
Similarly, non-oral therapies for erectile dysfunction have had
limited success as treatment options;154 for aesthetic or comfort rea-
sons, many have not been well accepted by patients. 155 For example,
145. See id. at 227, 244.
146. See id.
147. See Elizabeth Cosgrove, Vasomax May Offer Impotent Men Alternative to Viagra,
CNN INTERACrivE (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://cnn.com./health/9806/02/viagra.al-
terative/index.html>; Stipp & Whitaker, supra note 138, at 122 (not yet approved but
in phase III trials and promising fewer side effects).
148. See Goldstein, supra note 135, at 1397 ("No effective oral therapy for erectile
dysfunction is currently available").
149. These include ginseng, crushed fennel seeds, licorice, pollen, sarsaparilla,
Asafoetida, hops, and small dried beetles (commonly known as the Spanish fly). See
Waguih R. Guirguis, Oral Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction: From Herbal Remedies to De-
signer Drugs, 24J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 69, 69-70 (1998). Their efficacy has never
been established. See id.
150. See id. at 70 (noting the belief that the user's penis will become as "strong
and as erect as the rhino's horn").
151. See id. (hormonal treatment is more likely to increase desire rather than
ability, and thus is largely ineffective).
152. Stipp & Whitaker, supra note 138, at 115.
153. See Guirguis, supra note 149, at 70-71 (including yohimbine, trazodone, phe-
noxybenzamine, bromocriptine, oxytocin, glyceryl trinitrate, zinc, phentolamine, apo-
morphine, and naltrexone). "None of these recent drugs gave rise ... to any real
improvement over that claimed by proponents of herbal remedies." Id. at 71.
154. Treatments have included: vascular surgery, penile prostheses (implants),
psychotherapy and behavioral therapy, androgen replacement therapy (when testicu-
lar failure is established), intracavernosal injection therapy (injection of vasodilator
substances into the corpora of the penis), vacuum/constrictive devices (a vacuum
device enlarges the penis and a constrictive device maintains the erection during in-
tercourse). See CONSENSUS, supra note 134; Medical Therapies for Erectile Dysfunction:
What's Practical?, CONTEMPORARY UROLOGY Dec. 1997, at 34, 38 [hereinafter Medical
Therapies].
155. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134; Medical Therapies, supra note 154, at 38.
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one of the more successful medical interventions prior to Viagra was
injection of vasodilator substances directly into the penis. 156 Under-
standably, physical or emotional discomfort with injectables resulted
in a high patient dropout rate.1 5 7 Penile prosthetic devices have also
had limited success.1 58
In short, until Viagra, treatment choices were so limited, unsuc-
cessful, or unappealing159 that insurance companies had few worries
of excessive demand. Until now, there was no "magic pill."'160 Com-
plicating matters, the definition of erectile dysfunction now includes a
subjective satisfaction component and a category for mild dysfunc-
tion. 161 Viagra's side effects and complications are reportedly mi-
nor,1 6 2 and combined with the medical recognition of partial erectile
dysfunction, literally millions of men may now appropriately seek
treatment for erectile dysfunction. 163
156. One particularly unpleasant side effect could be an unrelenting erection
(priapism), which may require potentially life-threatening medical intervention in pa-
tients suffering from hypertension. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134; see also Stipp &
Whitaker, supra note 138, at 116.
157. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134. The most common injectable, papaverine,
could cause life-threatening complications. See id. Other treatments, each with lim-
ited success, include vacuum constriction devices, penile prostheses, and surgery. See
id. See also Medical Therapies, supra note 154, at 38.
158. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134 ("Mechanical failure, infection, and ero-
sions" have been the main problems, in addition to surgical risk and failure requiring
reoperation); Medical Therapies, supra note 154, at 45 ("Penile implants are currently
our most effective form of therapy in terms of long-term satisfaction, yet at the follow-
up, only 70% of men are still using their devices.").
159. See Medical Therapies, supra note 154, at 45 (footnote omitted) (discussing
difficulties of treatment (prior to FDA approval of Viagra)).
160. "Clinicians in this field often are told at the end of an assessment interview,
'I wish you had a magic pill' .... Finding such a treatment has always been the dream
of many scientists, and many attempts have been made over the years." Guirguis,
supra note 149, at 69.
161. See CONSENSUS, supra note 134 (emphasis added) (referring to the "inability
of the male to attain and maintain erection of the penis sufficient to permit satisfactory
sexual intercourse").
162. See Goldstein, supra note 135, at 1403. "The American Urological Associa-
tion Panel on the Treatment of Organic Erectile Dysfunction stated that the ultimate
goal is a therapy that is reliable, has minimal side effects, and is simple to use.
Sildenafil appears to meet these specifications." Id. (citations omitted). Like Phen-
fen, approval by the FDA and widespread availability may reveal previously unknown
or underappreciated side effects. See Sixteen Deaths Among Viagra Users Prompt Renewed
Warning, CNN INTRAcrnrvE (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://cnn.com/health/9806/
09/viagra/index.html> (reporting Viagra deaths attributed to exertion and/or inter-
action with nitrate-containing heart drugs); Victoria Slind-Flor & Bob Van Voris,
Viagra May Have Legal Downside, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at Al (describing ophthal-
mologic effect); Stipp & Whitaker, supra note 138, at 120 ("The worst nightmare for
developers of sex pills and other impotence therapies... is that the craze for ED pills
will lead to a rash of 'coital coronaries.'").
163. SeeFeldman, supra note 131, at 55, 58 (describing Massachusetts Male Aging
Study and statistical validity of subjective assessment of the existence of "minimal,
moderate, or complete impotence"); Goldstein, supra note 135, at 1402 (describing
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2. Insurance Coverage for Viagra
Recently, Aetna decided not to cover Viagra under its health
plans unless employers purchased an optional rider. Aetna character-
ized Viagra as a "recreational/lifestyle" drug and expressed concern
that "Viagra could cost it more than $50 million a year. 1 64 Similarly,
Kaiser, the nation's largest health maintenance organization, an-
nounced it would not cover pharmaceuticals for treatment of sexual
dysfunction in future plans, but would make an optional supplemen-
tal benefit rider available to large purchasers. 165 Revealing an internal
inconsistency, Kaiser acknowledged that sexual dysfunction remained
a covered illness, and that it would continue to provide medical care
to evaluate sexual dysfunction. However, it deemed coverage of
pharmaceuticals a "distinction between quality-of-life and [treatment]
deemed medically necessary."1 66
Both the subjectivity of the diagnosis and the comparative ease of
the new treatment 167 concern insurers considering Viagra coverage 168
and dosage limitations 69 under existing drug plans. 170 While Kaiser
and Aetna deny coverage for the drug unless a special rider is
self-administered International Index of Erectile Function). See also Stipp & Whita-
ker, supra note 138, at 118 (describing the new "epidemic"); David Morrow, Insurers
Limiting Payments for Use of Impotence Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at A4 (reporting
that large insurers are "fearing huge payouts to millions of American men"); Ovetta
Wiggins, State Limits Viagra Coverage Four Pills a Month for Workers, Seniors, Rxcoim (N.
N.J.),June 5, 1998, at Al (state's bill under its state employee and Medicaid plans for
Viagra totaled $483,000 for April, 1998 and fears that without limits state's Viagra bill
may reach $6 million a year).
164. Drugs: Aetna Won't Pay for Viagra in N.Y., L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at D4
[hereinafter Drugs].
165. See Kaiser Press Release, supra note 4, at 1.
166. Id. Kaiser will reportedly not cover pharmaceutical treatments. See Olmos,
supra note 29, at Al.
167. Users are instructed to take a tablet by mouth "approximately 1 hour before
sexual activity" but that it is effective anywhere from one-half to four hours prior to
sexual activity. Pfizer, supra note 133.
168. SeeJohn Hendren, Health Care Premiums to Spiral, J. REc. (Okla. City),June 3,
1998, available in 1998 WL 11954372 (attributing rising costs of insurance to "lifestyle
drugs" such as Viagra); David R. Olmos, Insurers Hold Reins with Viagra: Drug Brings Big
Role the Health Industry Plays to Forefront, DET. Ni-ws, June 7, 1998, at A5 [hereinafter
Insurers Hold Reins]; Prudential Sued Over Viagra Non-Coverage, REc. (N. NJ.), May 29,
1998, at B2 (reporting on lawsuit filed for denial of coverage); Slind-Flor & Van Voris,
supra note 162, at Al ("insurance companies and insurance lawyers are asking them-
selves how much is enough, as the companies decide whether-and how often-to reim-
burse patients using Viagra"); Business World: Suing for Viagra, J. REC. (Okla. City),
May 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11953991 (reporting lawsuit filed against Oxford
Health Plans).
169. Pfizer states that the "maximum recommended dosing frequency is once
per day." Pfizer, supra note 133 (Dosage and Administration). When covered, insur-
ers are limiting the monthly allocation. See, e.g., Maura Lerner, Health Insurers Balk at
Paying $10 a Piece for Viagra Pills, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.Paul), June 3, 1998, at Al
(reporting on Minnesota's three largest health plans' decisions to study before cover-
ing); Insurers Hold Reins, supra note 168; Wiggins, supra note 163 (reporting that New
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purchased, other insurers are establishing clinical guidelines to dis-
courage inappropriate prescriptions.' 71 Likewise, states are struggling
to decide how to provide Medicaid' 72 coverage for Viagra in light of
the federal command to cover it.173
Characterizing Viagra as a "lifestyle" drug places it squarely within
the moral hazards insurers have typically avoided.174 However, with-
out a specific exclusion for the treatment of impotency or Viagra in
particular, it is difficult to conclude that a prescription for the treat-
ment of impotency is not medically necessary.' 75 How can Kaiser rec-
Jersey's Blue Cross and Blue Shield will pay for 12 pills per month while Cigna Health-
care of Northern New Jersey limits patients to six pills).
170. See Olmos, supra note 29, at Al (quoting Dr. Francis J. Crosson, executive
director of the Permanente Foundation) (commenting that the panel it assembled to
develop Kaiser's policy "was unable to find a scientific or clinical basis for determining
who should get Viagra and who should not"). Only 15% of plans reportedly exclude
coverage for Viagra and impotency. See SEGAL COMPANY, supra note 53.
171. See Eileen Glanton, Nation's Largest HMO Won't Cover Viagra, CHARUtsTON
GAzErr ,June 20, 1998, at 7A, available in 1998 WL 5958203 (Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Rochester is covering six pills per month for patients who have suffered impotency
for at least six months).
172. Medicaid generally requires coverage for use of any FDA approved drugs
that are deemed medically necessary. See Raiford, supra note 89, at 38-39. See also
Laurie McGinley, U.S. Considering Requiring Medicaid to Pay for Viagra, WALL ST. J., May
29, 1998, at B6 (reporting that federal officials doubt that Viagra will fall into an
exempted Medicaid coverage category); Hilary Waldman, State Limits Medicaid Viagra
Payments, HARTFoRD-CouRANr, May 30, 1998, at B2 (reporting on federal policy re-
quiring state Medicaid programs to pay for any FDA approved drugs and comment-
ing, "The policy has irked some men with private insurance companies, many of
which refuse to pay for Viagra").
173. See Michele Boorstein, Two States Refuse to Pay for Viagra, AuS=I AM. STATES-
A, July 4, 1998, at A6 (reporting that New York and Wisconsin plan to deny cover-
age in defiance of directive and Michigan is considering its options); Voinovich Asks
U.S. to Review Medicaid Ruling on Viagra, PLArN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), July 13,
1998, at 4B (Ohio balking, estimating cost at $12.6 million per year); Jerry Zremski,
State to Ignore Order to Pay for VWagra, BurEAto NEws, July 4, 1998, at Al. In response,
the House Appropriations Committee is now considering bills to allow states to refuse
Viagra coverage and to prohibit federal expenditures for Viagra. See House Panel Oks
Labor-HHS Bill Sets Stage For Fight, CONGRESS DALy/A.M., July 15, 1998, available in
1998 WL 12689683. The variability of coverage among Medicaid programs and be-
tween Medicaid and private insurers has drawn comment on the inequities. See
Avram Goldstein, Medicaid Covers Viagra in Maryland and D.C., Not in Vzrginia, WASH.
Posr, May 9, 1998, at Al; Debra Saunders, Government in the Bedroom: Viagra Nation,
S.F. CHRON., May 22, 1998, at A25 (reporting that Medicaid programs in Alabama and
Florida have a four-pill cap, Louisiana and Maryland cap at six pills, Utah at 10 and
California has no cap and has approved at least one prescription for 30 pills).
174. When Kaiser announced its decision, Kaiser reportedly assembled a na-
tional group of Kaiser physicians, pharmacists, ethicists and health policy experts,
who, reportedly considered the large costs as well as "the distinction between quality-
of-life treatments and those deemed medically necessary." Kaiser Press Release, supra
note 4, at 1.
175. For example, although each provider is permitted latitude, many Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans define medical necessity as:
1) required for diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury;
19981
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ognize the diagnosis of impotency as a medical condition for which it
continues to provide coverage, but characterize its treatment as a qual-
ity-of-life issue for which it will not provide coverage? Kaiser has ac-
knowledged that demand and cost are prime factors, thus suggesting
that the extraordinary success and subsequent demand for a treat-
mentjustifies excluding coverage.' 76 While insurers probably are cor-
rect that Viagra promises to be a "blockbuster" pharmaceutical, 177
which may contribute to escalating health costs and premiums if
abused and overprescribed, 178 Aetna and Kaiser have maligned the
disease of impotency and characterized its treatment as a "lifestyle"
choice,179 harkening back to the concept of moral hazard.' 80
Rather than refusing coverage, insurers could have developed ex-
ternal controls to curb abuse. Insurers covering Viagra could require
doctors to firmly establish the diagnosis to exclude inappropriate
uses.' 81 Possible coverage solutions include setting limits on coverage
when the cause is not organic (in plans that exclude or limit coverage
for psychiatric ailments),182 when erectile dysfunction is caused by al-
2) consistent with the symptoms or diagnosis and treatment of the illness or
injury;
3) appropriate with regard to standards of good medical practice;
4) not primarily for the convenience of patient and provider.
Raiford, supra note 89, at 51.
176. See Kaiser Press Release, supra note 4, at 1.
177. See Cowley, supra note 139, at 62 ("even a $1 billion drug is considered a
blockbuster - but a big burden for a health-care system").
178. See Diane Levick, Insurers Cracking Down on Medicines/Prescription Use Soars;
HMOs Fight Rising Cost, HARTFoRD CouRANT, June 7, 1998, at Al (reporting that pre-
scription costs are rising 12-18 percent per year and insurers will raise charges, create
preferred drug lists and give incentives to doctors to use preferred drugs); Health Care
Costs to Balloon Next Year, REc. (N. N.J.), June 4, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Balloon]
(reporting that prescription drug plans (pharmacies charging insurers) will increase
15-22 percent).
179. See Drugs, supra note 164 ("recreational/lifestyle use" and "not a medical
necessity"); Balloon, supra note 178 ("pricey lifestyle drugs like Viagra"); Lerner, supra
note 168 (quoting Dr. William Borkon, medical director of the Sexual Health Clinic
at Park Nicollet Medical Center in St. Louis Park, "We're talking about recreational
sex here"); Insurers Hold Reins, supra note 169 (noting "increasing role that health
insurers, by default, play in deciding what is important to society" and asking where
line should be drawn between medically necessary and enhancement); Craig J.
Cantoni, Should Insurance Put a Tiger in Your Tank?, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1998, at A18
("performance-enhancing medicine"); Kaiser Press Release, supra note 4, at 1; Aetna
Letter, supra note 4, at 7 (describing "performance enhancement/lifestyle nature of
Viagra").
180. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
181. Aetna maintains that it is impossible to establish meaningful standards. See
Aetna Letter, supra note 4, at 3-4. The federal Medicaid program could reevaluate its
decision to require state coverage "if there [was] evidence the drug [was] being mis-
used." Zremski, supra note 173, at Al.
182. For example, prior to their decision to exclude coverage entirely, Kaiser
considered limiting coverage to impotency caused by an underlying physical disease.
See Morrow, supra note 163, at A4 (reporting that Kaiser will institute an increased co-
payment and will cover only those with physical ailments or diseases).
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coholism or substance abuse, 83 or when the cause is not sufficiently
documented and diagnosed. Insurers can demand that urologists de-
velop and follow standards of care that establish appropriate use by
afflicted individuals, as opposed to "recreational" use by non-sufferers.
In addition, insurers may appropriately limit the quantity pre-
scribed.' 84 Although insurers and Medicaid programs express confi-
dence' 85 that they can properly impose limits on the number of pills
per month, the notion of rationing sex is unusual and new to them. 8 6
3. Insurance Coverage for Other Erectile Dysfunction Treatments
Whether insurers will eventually cover Viagra generally, and in
what quantity, remains to be seen. However, as decisions described in
the next section reveal, the insurance coverage experience for other
erectile dysfunction treatments suggests that coverage will vary sub-
stantially from plan to plan.
a. Is Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction Medically Necessary?
If a plan does not expressly exclude coverage for treatment of
erectile dysfunction, an insured is likely to prevail against an insurer's
denial on grounds that treatment is not medically necessary, especially
when the cause is organic.'8 7 For example, in Doe v. Northwestern Na-
tional Life Insurance Company,'88 plaintiff sought insurance coverage for
the surgical insertion of a penile prosthetic device, necessitated by dia-
betes-related impotency. The insurer argued that inserting the pros-
thesis only treated a symptom (impotency) of a preexisting condition
(diabetes), but impotency was not, itself, a sickness as required under
183. See Waldman, supra note 172, at B2 (limiting coverage to men with impo-
tence caused by physical or organic problems, excluding coverage for impotence
caused by mental illness or substance abuse).
184. SeeWiggins, supra note 163, at Al (reporting that Viagra marks the first time
that its Medicaid program has ever set a dosage limit and noting concern that it may
lead to increasing limitations on other drugs).
185. See e.g., Goldstein, supra note 173 (interviewing Maryland and D.C. Medi-
caid officials explaining decision to cover but limit dosage); Lerner, supra note 169, at
Al (interviewing health plan providers asking, "Is it important to pay for men to have
intercourse?" and what limits should be placed on coverage); Insurers Hold Reins, supra
note 168, at A5 (discussing insurers' increasing role in regulating sexual practices).
186. See Lerner, supra note 169, at Al; Insurers Hold Reins, supra note 168, at AS;
McGinley, supra note 172 (noting federal government may give states authority to set
limits on coverage); Waldman, supra note 172, at B2 (state to impose limit of six pills
per month and limit drug to those with organic causes).
187. For example, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS) limits, but does not exclude, coverage for penile implants and
testicular prostheses. See 32 C.F.R § 199.4(e) (8) (i) (E) (1998). Coverage is provided
when the condition is of "organic origins (i.e., trauma, radical surgery, disease pro-
cess, for correction of congenital anomaly)" and for "penile implants for organic im-
potency." Id.
188. 355 S.E.2d 867, 868 (S.C. 1987).
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the policy.1 8 9 The court rejected the insurer's distinction that diabe-
tes was the sickness rather than impotency, and relied instead on the
"plain and popular" definition of sickness to conclude impotency was
a covered sickness even though diabetes was a preexisting
condition. 90
Often impotency is due to work-related injuries or diseases, and
workers' compensation cases, also relying on the medically necessary
standard, suggest that treatment of erectile dysfunction is medically
necessary.' 91 Workers' compensation cases indicate that, without an
express exclusion in an insurance policy, courts are likely to deter-
mine that restoration of sexual function and treating erectile dysfunc-
tion are medically necessary and not "lifestyle" treatments.1 92
b. Express Exclusions in the Insurance Contract
Like many sexual and reproductive matters, erectile dysfunction
is often subject to an express exclusion within the insurance policy.' 93
If expressly excluded, an insured's best hope is to allege an ambiguity
in the insurance contract, although cases demonstrate the difficulty of
establishing such an ambiguity.
One form of alleged ambiguity arises where the contract excludes
a category of procedures and provides a list of such procedures as
well. For example, in Robertson v. N.N. Investors Life Insurance Co.' 94
plaintiff filed suit to recover medical expenses related to insertion of a
penile implant. Plaintiffs health insurance policy expressly excluded
"cosmetic surgery, which term includes but is not limited to... penile
implants ... ". 1 95 Plaintiff contended that an ambiguity existed within
the contract and that the contract did not exclude certain indications
for penile implants, which were not cosmetic in nature, but were med-
189. See id. at 868-69.
190. See id. at 869.
191. Employment-related causes of impotency include, among others, injury,
trauma, exposure to toxins, complications of surgery. See generally Tracy Bateman,
Annotation, Workers' Compensation as Covering Cost of Penile or Similar Implants Related to
Sexual or Reproductive Activity, 89 A.L.R.4th 1057 (1992 & Supp. 1998).
192. See generally Regnier v. Industrial Comm., 707 P.2d 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(artificial spermatocele/quadriplegic injury; also covering artificial insemination);
Crain Burton Ford Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 944 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (penile im-
plant/impotence related to back injury); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 410 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1980) (penile implant/back injury); Boyd v. DSI
Transports, Inc., 575 So. 2d 909 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (penile implant/back injury-
coverage for second surgery); Canas v. Maryland Cas. Co., 459 N.W.2d 533 (Neb.
1990) (penile implant/back injury); Jackson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 734 S.W.2d
617 (Tenn. 1987) (penile implant/crushed pelvis).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. Fifteen percent of health plans
specifically exclude treatment or drugs for impotency. See SEGAL COMPANY, supra note
53.
194. 385 S.E.2d 681, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
195. Id.
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ically necessary. 196 Plaintiff argued that his penile implant corrected
an organic condition, and therefore the indication for his surgery did
not fall within the cosmetic surgery exclusion.197 However, the court
agreed with the insurer that the express exclusion controlled; the
court concluded that even if plaintiffs need for the penile implant
was not cosmetic, the express exclusion was "clear and
unambiguous.' 98
Another type of ambiguity can arise when certain conditions are
excluded from coverage but no list of such procedures is provided.
For example, in Longpre v. Midwest Optical Supply, Inc.,199 plaintiff
sought coverage from his employee health plan for surgical insertion
of a penile prosthetic device to correct his long-term impotency.
Plaintiff claimed the insurance contract language was ambiguous.200
Unlike the express provision in Robertson that excluded implants, the
policy in question here excluded coverage for any procedures "related
to sex transformations or sexual dysfunctions or inadequacies" but did
not list any particular procedures. 201 The court rejected plaintiff's
poorly articulated claim that "sexual dysfunction or inadequacies" ex-
clusion was ambiguous, concluding that plaintiffs "impotency [was]
clearly a sexual dysfunction or impaired functioning of his sexual or-
gans."20 2 Although inartful, the plaintiff probably was attempting to
argue that his impotency was not a "sexual dysfunction or inadequacy"
but was a symptom of an organic disease that was covered under the
policy.2 03
B. Gender Dysphoria and Transsexual Surgery
1. The Treatment of Gender Dysphoria
Gender dysphoria refers to a "psychological state whereby a per-
son demonstrates dissatisfaction with their sex of birth and the sex
role, as socially defined, which applies to that sex, and who request
hormonal and surgical sex-reassignment." 20 4 Transgenderism 20 5 has
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 682.





203. The argument that impotency is a covered symptom of an organic disease is
exactly the opposite of the Doe argument that it was a disease in and of itself. See Doe,
355 S.E.2d at 868-69. Doe made the argument that it was its own disease because the
plaintiffs diabetes was preexisting. See i&. Although plaintiffs lost in these cases, most
authors note ajudicial bias in favor of insureds through judicial devices to construct
the insurance policy to achieve the reasonable expectations of the insured. See Hall &
Anderson, supra note 73, at 1648-49.
204. HARRY BENjAmIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, STAN-
DARDS OF CARE 3.4, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at 505 [hereinafter
1998]
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existed throughout history;20 6 generally, transsexuals have been mis-
treated and misunderstood within society.207
There is broad consensus now that transsexualism is not a "lifes-
tyle choice" but an involuntary state marked by discordance between
gender identity and sex.208 Moreover, medical and surgical treatment
for appropriate individuals is a well-accepted treatment. "The major-
ity of modem behavioral scientists, regardless of their thoughts on the
etiology of this disorder, agree that a diagnosis of transsexualism exists
and, with a few exceptions, the majority believe that, in properly se-
lected patients, reassignment surgery is the best way to normalize their
lives." 209 Transsexuality occurs in approximately one in 50,000, and
between 6000 to 10,000 transsexuals are estimated to live within the
United States.210
Transsexualism is generally marked by a "passionate, life-long
conviction that one's psychological gender - that indefinable feeling
of maleness or femaleness - is opposite to one's anatomical sex."211
STANDARDS OF CARE]. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Association is the
internationally recognized professional organization for the study of transsexualism
and gender dysphoria. The professional organization, named for Harry Benjamin, a
pioneer in the field of gender dysphoria, first promulgated standards of care in 1979.
These standards enjoy broad recognition among professionals treating gender
dysphoria. See Dallas Denny &Jan Roberts, Results of a Questionnaire on the Standards of
Care of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, in GENDER BLEND-
ING, supra note 24, at 320, 322 [hereinafter Standards of Care]. Information on the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association as well as the Standards
of Care are also available at <http://vAvw.tc.umn.edu/nlhome/m201/colemO01/
hbigda/>.
205. Transsexualism is defined as "[t]he desire to change one's anatomic sexual
characteristics to conform physically with one's perception of self as a member of the
opposite sex." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1841 (26th ed. 1995). See also Rich-
ard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism,"
4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 n.1 (1997); Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor:
The Collision of Sex and Gender, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 835, 841-42 and accompanying notes
(1995); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 TEMp.
POL. & Crv. RTs. L. REv. 27, 29-34 (1995). The precise etiology of gender dysphoria is
unknown. See Pearlman, supra, at 867-68.
206. See Dallas Denny, Transgender: Some Historical, Cross-Cultural, and Contempo-
rary Models and Methods of Coping and Treatment, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at
33, 35-38; Storrow, supra note 205, at 275-278 and accompanying notes.
207. See Denny, supra note 206, at 33.
208. See Pearlman, supra note 205, at 870.
209. David A. Gilbert, M.D., et al., Transsexual Surgery in the Genetic Female, 15
CLINICS IN PLASTIC SURGERY 471, 471 (1988); see also Donald R. Laub, M.D., et al.,
Vaginoplasty for Gender Confirmation, 15 CLINICS IN PLASTIC SURGERY 463, 470 (1988);
Storrow, supra note 205, at 280-84 (discussing consensus of medical authority).
210. See Gilbert, supra note 209, at 471.
211. Jerold Taitz, The Law Relating to the Consummation of Marriage Where One of the
Spouses is a Post-Operative Transsexual, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 141, 143 (1986), quoted in
Pearlman, supra note 205, at 841 & n.21. Gender dysphoria manifests in early child-
hood; discordance between sex and gender identity becomes more pronounced as
secondary sex characteristics develop in adolescence. SeeJanis R. Walworth, Sex Reas-
signment Surgery in Male-to-Female Transsexuals: Client Satisfaction in Relation to Selection
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Although gender dysphoria occurs in both men and women equally,
men (in the United States) present for treatment more frequently.212
The costs, the length of time, and the discomfort associated with
sex-reassignment surgery are substantial, but for some, the intensity of
dissatisfaction compels treatment nevertheless. 213 Medical treatments
include hormonal therapy214 and surgical sex-reassignment.2 15 Exten-
sive pre-operative and post-operative psychological treatment and
Criteria, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at 353; Gilbert, supra note 209, at 472.
Females have an easier adjustment in early childhood because of social tolerance of
tomboyishness. See id.
212. See Gretchen Fincke and Roger Northway, Patterns in and Treatments for Gen-
der Dysphoria, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at 383, 387-88. This is a Western
phenomenon. In China, demand for female-to-male surgery outnumbers male-to-fe-
male. See Bonnie Bullough et al., Introduction to Counseling and Treatment, in GENDER
BLENDING, supra note 24, at 371.
Gilbert reports that the incidence of male-to-female transsexuals seeking medical
intervention has historically been much higher but that "[r]ecently there has been a
dramatic shift in the ratios," which he attributes to "an expanded public awareness
regarding transsexualism, the persistence of transsexuals to undergo definitive genital
surgery, the stability of female transsexuals, and a renewed enthusiasm and hope for
advancement in phalloplasty surgery." Gilbert, supra note 209, at 472.
213. See Gilbert, supra note 209, at 472; Lisa Middleton, Insurance and the Reim-
bursement of Transgender Health Care, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at 455; Karyn
Hunt, S.F. Weighs Coverage for Sex-change Operations, SAN DMGO UNION-TRm., Sept. 26,
1996, at A2 (surgery costs between $10,000 and $20,000, not including extensive psy-
chiatric evaluations and life-long hormonal treatment required). See also Maggert v.
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Someone eager to undergo this mutilation
is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric disorder.").
214. Hormonal sex reassignment refers to the administration of androgens
to genotypic and phenotypic females, and the administration of estrogens
and/or progesterones to genotypic and phenotypic males, for the purpose
of effecting somatic changes in order for the patient to more closely approxi-
mate the physical appearance of the genotypically other sex.
STmNDARDS OF CARE, supra note 204.
215. Genital surgical sex reassignment refers to surgery of the genitalia and/
or breasts performed for the purpose of altering the morphology in order to
approximate the physical appearance of the genetically other sex in persons
diagnosed as gender dysphoric. Such surgical procedures as mastectomy,
reduction mammoplasty, augmentation mammoplasty, castration,
orchidectomy, penectomy, vaginoplasty, hysterectomy, salpingectomy, vagi-
nectomy, oophorectomy and phalloplasty in the absence of any diagnosable
birth defect or other medically defined pathology, except gender dysphoria,
are included in this category labeled sex reassignment.
STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 204. Also included are non-genital surgical proce-
dures (i.e., to the nose, throat, chin, cheeks, etc.) conducted for the purpose of
achieving a more masculine or feminine appearance. See id. See also Tedeschi, supra
note 205, at 32 (describing surgical procedures); Stanley H. Biber, Current State of
Transsexual Surgery: A Brief Overview, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, at 374-376
(describing surgical procedures).
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evaluation are rigorous and ensure an unequivocal and prolonged
commitment to the procedure.216
The criteria for surgery include (1) recommendation in writing by
two behavioral scientists, one of whom has know[n] the patient in a
therapeutic relationship for 6 months; (2) a successful cross-living
test over a 1-year period; and (3) legal, social, psychological, sexual
and (exogenous) endocrine success during cross-living.217
These well-developed criteria, the stigma of transsexualism, and the
rigors of treatment make it unlikely that unnecessary and ill-consid-
ered surgery is performed often.
2. Insurance Coverage for Gender Dysphoria
Defining the status of transsexuals and the treatment of transsex-
ualism pose particular analytical difficulties for medicine and law gen-
erally.218 Health insurers must determine whether transgenderism is
a physical or psychological illness, a life choice, or a naturally occur-
ring gender state along a continuum of gender.219
a. Insurance Coverage
Medical coverage for transsexual surgery and/or hormonal treat-
ment is very uncommon, but reportedly increasing. 220 It is typical, but
216. See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 204. Some criticize the conservatism of
the standards. See Nancy Reynolds Nangeroni, SRS Tomorrow: The Physical Continuum,
in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 24, 344, 349-50 (favoring more liberal self-choice).
217. Laub, supra note 209, at 463 (referring to the Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association Standards of Care).
218. See Louis H. Swartz, Law and Transsexualism, in GENDER BLENDING, supra
note 24, at 422; See generally Richard Green, Transsexualism and the Law, 22 BuLL. AM.
AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 511 (1994) (legal issues confronting transsexualism include,
among others, privacy, name changing, employment discrimination, marriage,
parenting, treatment in prisons, insurance coverage, military service); Pearlman, supra
note 205, at 851-864; Storrow, supra note 205, at 285-332 (marriage, parenting, name
and birth certificate changes, prisoner rights, employment discrimination); Tedeschi,
supra note 205, at 32-35.
219. There is an increasing sentiment that transsexualism is not a disease but
rather a gender identity along a spectrum that is not binary. See Pearlman, supra note
205, at 843-44, 871-72; Nangeroni, supra note 216, at 34849; Denny, supra note 206, at
40; Holly Boswell, The Transgender Paradigm Shift Toward Free Expression, in GENDER
BLENDING, supra note 24, at 53, 56.
220. See Gilbert, supra note 209, at 486 (noting increasing "willingness of insur-
ance companies to compensate for associated surgical procedures"); E-mail from Judy
Van Maasdam, former executive director of the Harry Benjamin International Gen-
der Dysphoria Association, coordinator of the Gender Dysphoria Program, Palo Alto,
California (formerly the Stanford University Gender Identity Program), (June 18,
1998) [hereinafter Van Maasdam E-mail] (on file with author). Ms. Van Maasdam
stated, "Coverage for hormonal and surgical therapies varies with each insurance con-
tract. Some specifically exclude treatment, while other insurers characterize the treat-
ments as cosmetic and exclude coverage on that basis. In my twenty years in the field,
I have noted that coverage is improving." Id. Ms. Van Maasdam also noted that
HMOs and managed care providers rarely cover the surgery, and that some, like Kai-
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not universal, for health insurance policies to expressly exclude cover-
age for transgender health care, especially in managed care and
HMOs.22 1 However, once an individual changes his or her name and
gender on medical records, coverage for otherwise routinely pre-
scribed hormonal therapy may not be noticed as being related to the
excluded coverage for treatment of transgender conditions and sex
change.222
In those unusual insurance contracts that do not expressly ex-
clude sex-reassignment surgery and/or hormonal treatment, courts
are likely to find the treatment medically necessary and not experi-
mental.223 In Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 2 2 4 plain-
tiff sought treatment for male-to-female gender dysphoria under an
employer-sponsored health plan. 225 Prior to filing the claim, the
plaintiff underwent hormonal treatment in anticipation of sex-reas-
signment surgery.226 The relevant policy exclusion provided: "Cos-
metic Surgery - Any of the listed expenses incurred in connection
with cosmetic surgery will be considered Covered Medical Expenses
ser, specifically exclude it. See id. Individual patients may be successful in challenging
insurers in some cases. See id. See also Gianna E. Israel and Donald E. Tarver, Genital
Reassignment Surgery, in TRANSCENDER CARE supra note 24, at 90 (1997) ("In the United
States getting insurance company coverage for genital-reassignment procedures is
considerably more difficult [than in Europe], although not impossible."). Doctors
sometimes prescribe hormone therapy following surgery without insurance company
challenge because the hormones are routinely prescribed for other conditions as well.
Telephone Interview with Lisa Middleton, Claims Executive, Workers' Compensation
(insurance specialist and author) (August 11, 1998) [hereinafter Middleton
Interview].
221. See CHOICES, supra note 52, at 141 n.19 (noting that all of the comprehen-
sive plans reviewed for his study excluded sex-reassignment surgery as a treatment
category); Lisa Middleton, Insurance and the Reimbursement of Transgender Health Care, in
TRANScENDER CAPE, supra note 24, at 215; Israel & Tarver, supra note 220, at 90. See,
e.g., Longpre v. Midwest Optical Supply, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 948 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(excluding coverage for procedures "related to sex transformations or sexual dysfunc-
dons or inadequacies"). CHAMPUS expressly excludes coverage for
"[t]ranssexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria" except in "one very
limited exception" for "congenital anomaly.., to correct sex gender confusion ...
which has been documented to be present at birth." 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e) (7) (1998).
222. Middleton Interview, supra note 220. Ms. Middleton explains that both
premarin (female hormones) and testosterone injections (male hormones) have
other common applications in males and females and so do not arouse suspicion after
the medical record and name have been changed to reflect the sex change. See id.
223. As to its general acceptance as an appropriate treatment for gender
dysphoria, see Laub, supra note 209, at 463, 470; Gilbert, supra note 209, at 486;
FREnE , A PFAFFLiN & AsTRI JUNGE, SEX REASSIGNmENT THIRY YEARS oF INTERNA-
TIONAL FoLLow-up STUDIES ATER SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY:. A COMPREHENsIVE RE-
wvIE, 1961-1991 (Roberta B. Jacobson & Alf B. Meier trans., Sympsion Publishing)
(on file with author). Despite general acceptance, insurers reportedly continue to
insist that surgical treatment is experimental. See Israel & Tarver, supra note 220, at
90-91; Middleton, in TRANSGENDER CARE, supra note 221, at 216-17.
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only if the cosmetic surgery is necessary for the repair of a non-occu-
pational injury which occurs while the family member is covered for
this benefit."227
The insurer argued that gender dysphoria was cosmetic surgery
not necessitated by a non-occupational injury.228 However, the court
considered expert testimony that transsexual surgery was not cosmetic
because it treated an underlying medical condition.2 29 Importantly,
the court noted that while transsexualism was once thought to be a
mere psychological disturbance, that was no longer the case: "current
theories suggest that an inconsistency in the so-called psychosexual
brain center causes gender to be perceived as opposite to the mor-
phology of the sexual apparatus. ' 230 The court rejected the insurer's
expert evidence that there was "nothing physically wrong with a
transsexual's body" and that the problem was "mental."23'
The court also explained that the arduous and radical procedure
was rarely sought and even more infrequently done, implying that it
was never done for cosmetic purposes, such as to "improve muscle
tone or physical appearance. '23 2 Rather, the court explained, the sur-
gery corrected a "psychological defect" and "is of a medical nature,"
not of a "strictly cosmetic nature. '233
As in the case of impotency, absent an express exclusion, courts
generally regard the treatment of sexual dysfunction or gender
dysphoria as medically necessary. 234 The hurdle more frequently en-
countered is an express exclusion for treatment.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 452.
230. Id. (quoting Michael S. Baggish, Testing and Treating Sex Change Candidates,
12 CONTEMP. OB/GYN 83-97 (1978)).
231. Id. at 453.
232. Id. See also Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar
Categories, and Law, 5 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 343, 382 (1997) (describing financial and
physical hardships of undergoing surgery).
233. Id.
234. Judicial decisions in favor of coverage are more likely to create broader cov-
erage than legislative efforts. See Stephen Whittle, Legislating for Transsexual Rights: A
Prescriptive Form, in GENDER BLENDIN, supra note 24, at 430. Legislative initiatives for
mandated coverage are unlikely in light of the negative public attitude toward
transsexuals and public discomfort with the radical treatment. See id. In fact, the
pervasive discriminatory attitude makes judicial, piecemeal decisionmaking more ad-
vantageous. See Louis H. Swartz, Abstracts of the XV Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association Symposium, Advantages of an Incrementalist (Piecemeal)
Approach to Legal Aspects of Sex Reassignment and Transsexuality in the US, UK, and Other
Common Law Jurisdictions, 1 IN'r'L J. oF TRANSGENDERISM, Oct.-Dec. 1997 (visited Au-
gust 10, 1998) <http://www.symposium.com/jt/hbigda/vancouver/swartz.html> (on
file with author). However, the City and County of San Francisco has begun develop-
ing guidelines to implement mandated coverage under public employee insurance
contracts. See Hunt, supra note 213, at A2. Judy Van Maasdam explains that San Fran-
cisco has mandated public employee coverage but that guidelines are still being
[Vol. 13:119
SEX SEXUAL PLEASURE, AND REPRODUCTION
b. Medicaid Coverage
Demands for coverage of transsexual sex-reassignment surgery
have been litigated several times under Medicaid with mixed results.
Some courts have upheld the state's right to exclude the treatment as
experimental and not medically necessary, while others have held the
express exclusions of transgender treatment in state Medicaid laws ar-
bitrary and capricious. 235
In 1992, the NewJersey Division of Medical Assistance and Health
Services decided to cover a female-to-male transsexual's phal-
loplasty.23 6 The forty-two-year-old patient had commenced psycho-
therapy and hormonal treatment at age twenty-eight and had
undergone a hysterectomy and a mastectomy at the time of the Medi-
caid request.237 Experts and treating physicians persuaded the court
that sex-reassignment surgery was the best and most appropriate treat-
ment for the patient and one expert wrote, "denying this patient phal-
loplasty at this time would be unwise both medically and
psychologically." 238
The court noted that under the Medicaid Act, a state's voluntary
participation with the federal Medicaid program meant the state
agreed to comply with federal statutory and regulatory requirements
of the program. 239 While the act vests discretion in each state to de-
sign its program, a state may not be arbitrary and capricious in its
determinations.240 NewJersey contended it did not have an improper
per se exclusion based solely on the diagnosis, but rather limited cov-
erage for sex-reassignment surgery to rare instances such as congeni-
tal malformations of genitalia.241 Moreover, New Jersey argued that
sex-reassignment surgery remained experimental. The court rejected
promulgated and the coverage currently has not been implemented. Van Maasdam
E-mail, supra note 220.
235. For cases ruling favorably under Medicaid, see Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d
546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (arbitrary and capricious to decline medically necessary care
solely based upon diagnosis); G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (not cosmetic nor experimental); Doe. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (medically necessary and not cosmetic); Doe v. State Department of Public
Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (cannot arbitrarily deny treatment solely
on the basis of diagnosis); M.K- v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, State
of New Jersey, No. DMA 2345-91, 1992 WL 280789, at paras. 50-61 (N.J. Adm. May 7,
1992).
For cases declining coverage, see Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 865-66 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (experimental and lacking medical consensus as to effectiveness); Dennis .
v. Lavine, 347 N.E.2d 893, 895 (N.Y. 1976) (denial not arbitrary and capricious on
specific facts of case).
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the state's arguments and specifically held that sex-reassignment sur-
gery was no longer experimental but had become "medically appro-
priate" and "necessary" for some individuals. 242 Despite continued
challenges, state Medicaid statutes and regulations persist in expressly
excluding sex-reassignment surgery. 243
c. Prisoner Cases
Prison medical care cases decided under the Eighth Amend-
ment 244 represent a fair number of transgender treatment cases and
also help define the landscape as to whether gender dysphoria treat-
ment is regarded as medically necessary, cosmetic, or experimental. 245
Recently, in Maggert v. Hanks,246 the Seventh Circuit issued a broad
opinion that severely limited a prisoner's right to treatment for gen-
der dysphoria, even though the court accepted the view that the treat-
ment was both appropriate and not experimental. Notably, Judge
Richard Posner reasoned that under the Eighth Amendment, prison-
ers were not entitled to better treatment than private insureds, even
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 43.385 (1997) (excluding transsexual
surgical procedures for gender change or reassignment); ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § R9-27-
203 (1997) (excluding sex-change operations, reversal of voluntarily induced infertil-
ity); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 140.6 (1998) (excluding artificial insemination and
medical or surgical transsexual treatment); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 114.1, § 36.02 (ex-
cluding sex-reassignment as "experimental or unproven"); MAss. REcs. CODE tit. 130,
§§ 410.405, 405.418, 415.408 423.415, 433.404, 433.440 (1998) (excluding sex-reas-
signment surgery and all pre- and post-hormone treatment as experimental, un-
proven or otherwise unnecessary); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RErs. tit. 18, § 505.2
(1998) (excluding gender reassignment including care, services, drugs or supplies);
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-13-05 (1998) (excluding cosmetic surgery such as "sex
change"); OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120-1200 (1996) (excluding transsexual surgery or re-
lated services); PA. CODE tit. 55, § 1163.59 (1998) (excluding transsexual surgical pro-
cedures); WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-86-200 (1998) (excluding treatment for gender
dysphoria, infertility, frigidity, or impotency); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HFS 107.03 (1997)
(expressly excluding transsexual surgery and hormonal treatment, treatment for im-
potence, penile prostheses, infertility treatment, artificial insemination, reversal of
sterilizations).
244. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments afflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (denial of treatment for serious medical and psychological
afflictions violates Eighth Amendment).
245. See, e.g., Farmer v. Hawk, 991 F.Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing that
transsexualism is a serious medical condition for which treatment is required under
the Eighth Amendment); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995) (prisoner
states a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical need where prison offi-
cials do not offer treatment for gender dysphoria). See generally Tedeschi, supra note
205, at 35-44 (discussing prisoner cases: Merriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan.
1986); Supre v. Ricketts, 596 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 792 F.2d 958 (10th
Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich.
1990), afJ'd per curiam, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp.
1335 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Farmer v. Haas, 927 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1991)).
246. See generally Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.).
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when the treatment sought was medically appropriate and
necessary.247
In Maggert, the prisoner filed suit against prison officials who de-
nied him estrogen therapy to treat gender dysphoria. 248 Prison offi-
cials refused to prescribe estrogen, instead offering psychotherapy.249
Although a material question of fact existed as to the actual diagnosis
of gender dysphoria and the appropriateness of treatment in this case,
Judge Posner seized the opportunity, explaining "there is a broader
issue, having to do with the significance of gender dysphoria in pris-
oners' civil rights litigation, that we want to address."250 The court
had no difficulty concluding that gender dysphoria "[was] a serious
psychiatric disorder, as we know because the people afflicted by it
[would] go to great lengths to cure it if they [could] afford the
cure."251 The court then acknowledged the cure was not psychother-
apy, but hormonal treatment followed by surgical removal of the sex
organs and reconstructive surgery, and that no other "less drastic" or
"less costly ' treatment had been successful.25 2 Thus, the court ac-
knowledged that gender dysphoria constituted a serious medical con-
dition for which hormonal and surgical treatment was medically
appropriate and necessary. 253
The court next reviewed how transsexuals outside of prison were
treated under standard insurance policies,254 CHAMPUS,255 and
Medicaid,256 concluding:
In general then, you have to pay for the treatment yourself; and the
total cost, which can easily reach $100,000, puts the treatment be-
yond the reach of a person of average wealth. Withholding from a
prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the wealthy can
afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. It is not unusual; and we cannot see what is cruel about refus-
ing a benefit to a person who could not have obtained the benefit if
he had refrained from committing crimes. We do not want
247. The economics-based opinion, penned by the Honorable Richard Posner, is
consistent with his thoughts in Sex and Reason, where Judge Posner aimed to "ex-
pound a specific economic theory of sexuality." POSNER, supra note 7, at 5. Judge
Posner acknowledged that economics provided a frame of reference for his legal rea-
soning, explaining, "law... could not be understood or improved without a healthy
dose of economics." Id. at 437.
248. See Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671.
249. See id. at 670-71.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. (citing only one study reporting success with a "nonradical" treat-
ment) (B.K. Puri & I. Singh, The Successful Treatment of a Gender Dysphoric Patient with
Pimozide, 30 AusRALIAN & N. Z.J. PsYcH. 422, 423 (1996)).
253. See Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671.
254. See supra Part III.B.2.
255. See supra note 221.
256. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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transsexuals committing crimes because it is the only route to ob-
taining a cure.
257
The court then compared the "seriousness" of this condition and its
cost to unknown, but more serious conditions, apparently as insurers
do when valuing treatment of matters of sexual health and reproduc-
tion generally:
It is not the cost per se that drives this conclusion. For life-threaten-
ing conditions, Medicaid and other public-aid, insurance, and char-
ity programs authorize treatments that often exceed $100,000.
Gender dysphoria is not, at least not yet, generally considered a se-
vere enough condition to warrant expensive treatment at the ex-
pense of others than the person suffering from it.
2 5 8
On one hand, the court acknowledged that gender dysphoria was
a serious psychiatric condition, not a lifestyle option, and effective
medical treatment was available and appropriate. Nevertheless, the
court concluded (apparently like the vast majority of insurers) the sex-
ual well-being of these individuals did not represent a "severe enough
condition to warrant expensive treatment."259 This conclusion is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the court's opinion that gender dysphoria is a
"serious psychiatric disorder" for which individuals go to "great
lengths" to seek a cure.2 60 Moreover, the court erroneously assumed
that in this case treating the disorder would result in a "great ex-
pense," when, in fact, the estrogen therapy the patient-prisoner
sought was an item of relatively small monthly cost.261
d. Unsympathetic Insurers and Sympathetic Courts
While insurers and government health care providers resist
health care coverage for erectile dysfunction and gender dysphoria,
two conditions that affect sexual satisfaction and respond to medical
intervention, courts have been somewhat more compassionate. Judi-
257. Maggert, 131 F.3d at 672.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. In some ways, the bias against mental health treatment is reflected in this
decision. Physical health is more valued. I for one would prefer intense physical pain
over intense mental anguish and a shorter life with sound mental health over a long,
psychiatrically disabled life. In short, the notion that insurance should expend its
greatest resources on life-threatening conditions but leave other insureds in mental
agony is not necessarily desirable. A more humane approach is possible. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. Hawk, 991 F. Supp. 19 (D.C. 1998) (approving a prison policy that main-
tained transsexuals at the level of change at which they entered the prison system).
261. See Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Move to Cover City Workers' Sex Changes, SF.
CHRON., Sept. 23, 1996, at A15 ("[C]osts of hormonal treatments are 'relatively low'
... about $100 a month") (discussing Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671). The court also ac-
knowledged the relative rarity of the condition, thus making the low-cost hormone
therapy a low-demand item in the prison population. See Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671
("gender dysphoria is a rare condition"). Moreover, the court ignored the fact that
prisoners cannot earn the money to cover hormonal therapy or acquire it except
through the prison doctors, unlike non-prisoners. See id.
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cial decisions acknowledge that treatment of sexual dysfunction and
gender dysphoria are indeed matters of medical necessity,2 62 and if
not excluded by the specific language of the contract or governing
law, treatment should be covered under standard policies.2 63 Cover-
age requests under Medicaid laws and prisoner requests under the
Eighth Amendment have been mixed, but individual judges show a
surprising depth of understanding and compassion. 264
Judge Posner wrote, 'Judges know next to nothing about the sub-
ject [of sex] beyond their own personal experience. 265 And yet, in
contrast to insurers, the opinions of many judges concerning medical
treatment coverage reflect ajudicial recognition that sexual well-being
is an important health matter.
IV. REPRODUc=rW HEALTH CAPE COvERAGE
In 1994, the Alan Guttmacher Institute published the "first large-
scale, comprehensive study of private insurance coverage of reproduc-
tive health care services."266 The study found that coverage for preg-
nancy, various reversible contraceptive methods, contraceptive
sterilization, induced abortion, and infertility treatment was discon-
certingly variable given the importance of such coverage to women's
health status.267 Overall, it noted that HMOs and other managed care
plans generally offered more comprehensive coverage than tradi-
tional indemnity plans, but that all plans were adequately deficient to
justify calling for national health care reform. 268 As a general rule,
insurers do not favor preventative medicine. 269 When it comes to sex-
ual and reproductive health, the preference for surgery and disease
treatment ignores the cost-savings and health benefits associated with
preventative medicine.270 For example, although insurance contracts
now cover the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, unlike the
contracts written a few decades ago, thirty percent of traditional in-
demnity plans do not cover routine, appropriate screening for sexu-
ally transmitted diseases that are vital to diagnosing these silent,
262. See supra notes 224, 236, 245 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part III.B.2.
264. See Storrow, supra note 205, at 284 ("Courts recognize the unique issues of
transsexuals and reach outcomes of a surprisingly humanitarian character.").
265. PosNER, supra note 7, at 1.
266. UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 5. The institute surveyed conventional
indemnity plans, preferred provider organizations and all 73 Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plans, point-of-service networks, and health maintenance organizations. See id.
267. See id. at 25. See also Waysdorf, supra note 65, at 756-57.
268. See UNEvEN & UNEQuAL, supra note 8, at 25.
269. See Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including Alternative and Comple-
mentary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 83, 154-55 & n.507
(1996); Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health
Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination Statutes, 16 WoMEN's
Ri-s. L. REP. 153, 168 (1995).
270. See generally Trussell, supra note 8; see also Roberts, supra note 8, at 7.
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destructive diseases. 271 An examination of reproductive health issues
(largely, but not exclusively, female health issues) demonstrates the
irrationality of health coverage for reproductive health.
A. Pregnancy
Each year, seven percent of women between the ages of fifteen
and forty-four become pregnant and give birth.2 72 The average Amer-
ican woman bears two children during her lifetime. 273 Prenatal and
obstetrical care preserves the life and health of both mother and
child, as pregnancy and childbirth have the potential for fatal
complication. 274
Prior to enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA),275 insurers commonly took the position that pregnancy was
271. The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that approximately 30% of em-
ployer-sponsored indemnity plans do not cover routine STD screening while 98% of
HMOs do cover screening. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 9 (also reporting
on coverage rates for mammograms, pap smears and annual exams). A Johns Hop-
kins University study released in 1998 now urges testing every six months for sexually
active adolescents females. See Gale R. Burstein, M.D., MPH, et al., Incident Chlamydia
Trachomatis Infections Among Inner-city Adolescent Females, 280 JAMA 521, 524 (1998).
Screening is essential to preserve the reproductive health of young women. See id.
For example, chlamydia has a relative lack of symptoms at onset but if untreated leads
to chronic pelvic inflammatory disease and infertility. See id. Because it is a silent
disease destroying the reproductive health of young women, the Centers for Disease
Control now recommend that sexually active women under 20 be screened annually.
See id. See also Sarah Yang, Biannual Chlamydia Screenings Urged/ Research: A Study of
3,200 Females Shows High Rates of Infection and Reinfection, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 2455425.
272. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Facts in Brief. Contraceptive Services (visited
June 10, 1998) <http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/fb18.html> [hereinafter Contracep-
tives]. Many more women become pregnant than actually deliver; fifty-six percent of
pregnancies are unplanned, and of those, 43% end in birth, 44% in abortion and
13% in miscarriage. See id. See also Law, supra note 69, at 364.
273. See Contraceptives, supra note 272.
274. Access to affordable maternal health care and insurance coverage saves lives
and preserves health. See Margaret M. Donahoe, Our Epidemic of Unnecessary Cesarean
Sections: The Role of the Law in Creating It, the Role of the Law in Stopping It, 11 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 200-208 (1996) (discussing nature of complications and mortality
rates); Waysdorf, supra note 65, at 754-67; Geetanjali Misra, et al., Poor Reproductive
Health and Environmental Degradation: Outcomes of Women's Low Status in India, 6 CoLo.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 284 (1995) (discussing impact of poverty on maternal
and child health).
275. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, enacted in 1978 amended Title VII, cov-
ering employment based group health plans, to provide:
(k) The terms 'because of' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not lim-
ited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and
nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health
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not a disease, but a voluntary condition, and treatment for it was not
medically necessary. 276 Many insurance contracts contained express
exclusions or limited maternity coverage. 277 Insurers providing some
maternity benefit coverage frequently instituted nine- or ten-month
waiting periods, presumably to avoid the risk of adverse selection. 278
These provisions impinged upon job-mobility.279
Unlike policies written a few decades ago, most health plans now
routinely cover pregnancy, although coverage is not universal.28 0 Well
over ninety percent of today's health plans cover pregnancy, even
when not governed by federal law.28' The improvement is due largely
to the enactment of PDA, though there had been some gradual volun-
tary improvement prior to enactment.28 2 The PDA prohibits discrimi-
nation in the provision of employer sponsored health benefits "on the
insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would
be endangered if the fetus was carried to term, or except where medical
complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That notion herein
shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise
affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
276. See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINOHAM JR., THE BLUES: A
HISTORY OF THE BLUE CRoss AND BLUE SHmELD SYsTrEM 25 (1997) (describing Depres-
sion era plans: "Coverage of hospitalized maternity care was seen as an especially poor
risk and a threat to group stability because hospitalization was, in effect, planned in
advance; the hospitalization and payment for it were a matter of choice"). See also
Lucinda Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for GenderJustice, 96 YALE
Lj. 914, 929-30 (1987) (reviewing DAVID L. Knup, Er AL. GENDERJUSTICE (1986)) ("the
'voluntary,' 'inexpensive' and 'welcome' arguments for denying economic security to
pregnant working women and their families are heavily value-laden").
277. Writing of plans in the 1950s, "[s]ome plans exclude maternity benefits,
others provide them without limitation, and still others provide such benefits after a
defined period, as for example nine months of insurance." See Smith, supra note 38,
at 78; CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 276, at 25.
278. See CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 276, at 25 ("Gradually most of
the Plans began to cover maternity services, some with waiting periods and extra
charges, and some without."). See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Lang, 190 So. 2d
730 (Ala. Ct. App. 1966) (premature birth is covered where policy provided for ten
month or one "which would have normally resulted in childbirth more than ten
months after" policy date); American Life Ins. Co. v. Schrimscher, 42 So. 2d 601 (Ala.
Ct. App. 1949) (provision requiring policy to be in force for ten months).
279. See Lawrence v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 883, 885-86
(D. Md. 1989) (pregnancy not covered where husband knew wife "might" be preg-
nant befofe policy's effective date); Vance v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 714 F. Supp. 203, 206
(E.D. Va. 1989) (wife's pregnancy not covered where she was treated for condition
before effective date of insurance); Lovett v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 131 S.E.2d
70, 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (where ectopic pregnancy commenced prior to effective
date of policy, insured was not covered under a clause covering "sickness due to a
disease originating during the term" even though diagnosis occurred after effective
date).
280. In a 1984 study of smaller plans, not covered by the PDA, only 18% of
smaller plans provided voluntary coverage. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at
12. Today, that number is 97%. See id.
281. See id.
282. Writing of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans during the Depression era:
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basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions."28 3 In
1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled the PDA also applied to
dependents of insureds under employer benefit plans. 2 4
Issues related to pregnancy discrimination continue, especially
regarding preexisting condition exclusions285 and the "drive through
delivery" discharge demands of some insurers and many HMOs. 28 6 In
order to overcome the pregnancy-related insurance problems caused
by preexisting condition clauses and job mobility, Congress recently
amended ERISA to provide that, "[a] group health plan, and health
insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage may not
impose any preexisting condition exclusion relating to pregnancy as a
preexisting condition."28 7 Beginning in 1998, federal law requires
group health plans and group health plan insurers to cover at least
forty-eight hours of hospital benefits for mother and child following
normal vaginal deliveries and ninety-six hours following cesarean sec-
To everybody's surprise, these experiments [in maternity coverage] were
generally successful. Nobody decided to have a baby just to con a Plan into
paying the hospital bill, and birth rates during the Depression were low.
Gradually most of the Plans began to cover maternity services, some with
waiting periods and extra charges, and some without.
CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 276, at 25.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). See Law, supra note 69, at 363. Passage of the
act overruled General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Court
ruled that exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability plan did not violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See Islesboro School Com-
mittee et al. v. Califano 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir. 1979). Gilbert relied on Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in which the Court upheld, as nondiscriminatory, the
exclusion of pregnancy coverage from a comprehensive health insurance plan of a
public employer. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 passim. In these cases, the Court reasoned
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not a gender-based classification.
See id. For articles analyzing Geduldigand noting its continued vitality, see Shannon E.
Liss, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Discrimination: the Lingering Effects of Geduldig and
Suggestions for Forcing its Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1997); Deborah
A. Ellis, Protecting "Pregnant Persons". Women's Equality and Reproductive Freedom, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 967 (1996); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 955 (1984).
284. See generally Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669 (1983).
285. See 1995 Proceedings of National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Con-
sumer Participation Board of Trustees, 1995-94 NAIC PRoc. 1160, at 1165 (1996) (con-
sumer representatives urging NAIC to develop model legislation concerning
pregnancy, including preexisting condition exclusions, limits on hospital stays, anes-
thesia and exclusions for pregnancy and childbirth generally); Kandice Engle, Preg-
nancy Discrimination in the Insurance Industry 1994, 34 U. LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 177, 179
(1996).
286. See McAteer, supra note 113, at 1692.
287. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1181 (d) (3) (West Supp. 1998).
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tion deliveries.288 Moreover, many states enacted mandates providing
for minimum stays or home follow-up within forty-eight hours. 2 9
B. Reversible and Nonreversible Contraception
Contraception is a high-demand health care service; approxi-
mately six in ten women (thirty-five million) between ages fifteen and
forty-four either use a reversible contraceptive method,290 have been
sterilized, or have a partner who has been sterilized.29' Twenty mil-
lion women use some form of reversible contraception, "29% take
oral contraceptives, 18% use condoms, 3% use the diaphragm, 3%
rely on periodic abstinence, 1% have an IUD, and 5% depend on
other methods." 29 2 Of unintended pregnancies, fifty-eight percent
are the result of contraceptive failure and forty-eight percent are the
result of failing to use any contraceptive method at all.293
Traditional indemnity insurers typically had not covered revers-
ible contraception, although most plans covered voluntary steriliza-
tion.294 Ironically, the costs associated with unwanted pregnancies are
almost always covered, making the use of contraceptives cost effective
288. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185 (West Supp. 1998). The law was prompted by con-
cerns over infant and maternal health and the concern that certain significant medi-
cal conditions associated with childbirth and in the newborn do not manifest prior to
48 hours. See McAteer, supra note 113, at 1692-93.
289. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.347 (Michie 1996); ARKx. CODE ANN. § 23-99-
404 (Michie Supp. 1998); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.87 (Deering 1998); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1102.1 (1997-98); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-58.1 (1997); ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/
356s (West 1998); IND. CODE § 27-8-24-5 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,160 (1997);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-145 (Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-812
(1997); MINN. STAT. § 62A.0411 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-133 (1997); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 689A.0425 (individual plans), 689B.520 (group and blanket health
plans), 689C. 194 (health plans for small employers) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-
61 (hospital service corporations), 17:48A-7k (medical service corporations), 17:48E-
35.9 (health service corporations),17B:26-2.1k (health insurers), 17B-46.1k (group
health and blanket insurers), 17b:27A-7.1 (individual plans) (1997); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 3216 (individual plans), 3221 (group or blanket health plans), 4303 (non-profit
medical and health and hospital service plans) (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-3-169 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6060.3 (1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1583 (West 1998); R-I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-33.1 (insurance), 27-19-23.1 (nonprofit
hospital corporations), 27-20-17.1 (nonprofit medical service corporations), 27.41-
30.1 (HMOs); Tx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.53F (West 1997).
290. Reversible medical or pharmaceutical methods include, for example: "in-
trauterine device (IUD) insertion, diaphragm fitting, Norplant insertion, Depo
Provera (DMPA) injection and oral contraception." UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note
8, at 12.
291. See Contraceptives, supra note 272.
292. Id. More than 50% of pregnancies are unintended. See id.
293. See Law, supra note 69, at 364 ("[A]lmost sixty percent of the 6.3 million
pregnancies that occur annually in the United States are unintended."); Alan
Guttmacher Institute, Facts In Brief Induced Abortion (visited July 13, 1998) <http://
wv.agiusa.org/pubs/fb-abortion2/fbabort2.html> [hereinafter Abortion].
294. See UNEvEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 9.
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and insurer decisions not to fund contraception confounding. 295 An
important economic study of fifteen methods of contraception found
all methods more effective and less costly over a five-year period than
using no method of contraception at all.296 It also noted that the con-
siderable savings associated with contraceptive use directly benefited
third-party payers who typically cover the costs associated with unin-
tended pregnancies. 29 7 The study further found that contraceptives
requiring physician and/or prescription services were usually more
cost effective than a variety of non-medical methods, such as absti-
nence, withdrawal, condoms, and over-the-counter spermicides. 298
Thus, it appears in the third-party payer's self-interest to provide cov-
erage for a wide range of contraceptive methods. 299
1. Reversible Contraception
Insurance coverage for reversible contraception health service is
extremely variable. "Almost half of all typical large-group plans (49 %)
do not routinely cover any contraceptive method at all."' ° Of the
ninety-seven percent of plans covering prescription drugs generally,
sixty-six percent exclude coverage for oral contraceptives. 30 1 In disre-
gard of the varied health needs of women, even plans covering some
295. See Trussell, supra note 8, at 500; Jacqueline E. Darroch, Cost to Employer
Health Plans of Covering Contraceptives (visited July, 13 1998) <http://www.agi-usa.org/
new/kaiser_0698.html>.
296. See Trussell, supra note 8, at 497; Herbert B. Peterson, A 40-Year-Old Woman
Considering Contraception, 279 JAMA 1651, 1652-53 (1998) (discussing methods of con-
traception and summarizing Trussell study). See generally David A. Grimes, A 17-Year-
Old Mother Seeking Contraception, 276 JAMA 1163 (1996), available in 1996 WL
14177559 (discussing methods of contraception and summarizing Trussell study). See
generally Sally Squires, Most Pregnancies Unplanned or Unwanted, Study Says; Finding
Raises Questions on the Costs and Effects of Contraception, WASH. Posr, May 9, 1995, avail-
able in 1995 WL 2092730 (citing Trussell study and concluding that covering all meth-
ods of contraception is cost effective).
297. See Trussell, supra note 8, at 500.
298. See id. The study found the lowest total cost (cost of the acquiring and using
method, its side effects, and cost of unintended pregnancies resulting from failure or
noncompliance) and greatest cost savings (over no method cost of $14,663) by
method over a five year period were as follows: Copper-T IUD (cost $540/savings
$14,122), vasectomy (cost $764/ savings $13,899), Norplant (cost $850/savings
$13,813), Depo-provera (cost $1290/savings $13,373), oral contraceptives (cost
$1784/savings $12,879), progesterone-T IUD (cost $2042/savings $12,621), male con-
dom (cost $2424/savings $12,239), tubal ligation (cost $2584/savings $12,079), with-
drawal (cost $3278/savings $11,385), periodic abstinence (cost $3450/savings
$11,213), diaphragm (cost $3666/savings $10,997), spermicide (cost $4102/savings
$10,561), female condom (cost $4872/savings $9791), sponge (cost $5700/savings
$8963), cervical cap (cost $5730/savings $8933). See id.
299. See id. Admittedly, the inference that insurers would enjoy a cost-savings
assumes that insurance coverage for superior methods would lead to more insureds
using superior methods of contraception. See id.
300. UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 12-13.
301. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 17. See also PLANNED PARENTHOOD
FEDERATION OF AMERICA, FAcr SHEETS: THE EQurn' PRESCRIPTION INSURANCE AND CON-
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reversible contraception do not usually cover a full range of methods,
thus narrowing the alternatives for their insureds.30 2 The lack of
broad coverage means some women, whose health or preferences
limit choice, may not recover the cost of the method they need, even
among plans that purport to provide contraception coverage.303
Cost is a key determinant in the contraceptive method chosen.304
A woman's financial burden is great because, on average, women re-
quire 20.5 years of contraception care and services during their
childbearing years, while they spend only 4.5 years attempting preg-
nancy, being pregnant, or experiencing postpartum.30 5
Studies indicate that providing contraception coverage would
add relatively little to the average insurance premium, raising it a
mere one percent.30 6 In the public arena, the Alan Guttmacher Insti-
tute estimates that "every tax dollar spent for contraceptive services
saves an average of $3 in Medicaid costs for pregnancy-related health
care and for medical care of newborns." 30 7 For a country so anxious
to curb abortion demand, failing to provide broad contraception cov-
erage makes no sense as the availability of contraception reduces the
demand for abortions.308
Professor Sylvia Law argues the PDA, as now written, actually pro-
vides a mandate for contraception coverage which insurers and em-
TRACEPTION COVERAGE Act (visited July 22, 1998) <http://www.plannedparenthood.
org/library/BIRTHCONTROL/Equity.html>.
302. Only 15% of large group plans covered the five methods included in the
AGI study (IUD insertion, diaphragm fitting, Norplant insertion, Depo Provera injec-
tion, and oral contraception). See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 12, 14.
Thirty-nine percent of HMOs, on the other hand, covered all five methods. See id.
303. Not all methods are safe or appropriate for all women. See generally Cathryn
B. Heath, Helping Patients Choose Appropriate Contraception, 48 AM. FAM. PHYSMCN 1115
(1993), available in 1993 WL 12216494 (evaluating methods based on such factors as
failure rate, age of patient, side effects, drug interactions, individual health risks and
likelihood of compliance). Age, health, and individual risk factors make contracep-
tive choice imperative. See id. See also Peterson, supra note 296; Grimes, supra note
296.
304. See Darroch, supra note 295.
305. See id. (footnotes omitted).
306. See id. (reporting on Alan Guttmacher study concluding that total cost to
cover would be $17.12 for employers and $4.28 to employees, a mean increase of
1%). See also Trussell, supra note 8, at 500; Contraceptives, supra note 272; Christine
Woolsey, Covering Contraceptives, Bus. INs., Apr. 19, 1993, at 18; New Bill to Ensure Insur-
ers Cover Contraceptives, Birth Control Can Aid Women's Health, Lower Costs: Physician, U.S.
NEWSWmE, available in 1998 WL 13603167 (hereinafter New Bill] ("[A]n insurance in-
dustry study concluded that providing comprehensive coverage for contraceptives
would cost only $16 per person per year as compared to $5,512 for just the prenatal
care and delivery of each unintended pregnancy carried to term.").
307. Contraceptives, supra note 272.
308. See Law, supra note 69, at 364-68 (discussing consequences of unintended
pregnancies). See also PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA FAct SHEETS:
THE EQuTY IN PRESCRIPTION INSURANCE AND CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE Act (visited
July 22, 1998) <http://wvw.plannedparenthood.org/library/BIRTHCONTROL/Eq-
uity.html>.
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ployers are improperly ignoring. 30 9 Professor Law points to the PDA's
broad language covering "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions," and concludes that the prevention of pregnancy is a related
medical condition.310 She draws support from judicial decisions inter-
preting the PDA. For example, courts have brought infertility within
the protection of the PDA on the premise that the law prohibits dis-
crimination against women based upon their childbearing poten-
tial.311  Using similar reasoning, courts have also prohibited
discrimination against women undergoing abortion.3 12
The detrimental impact on women when insurers neglect sexual
and reproductive health matters is most apparent in the denial of con-
traception coverage because the consequences of unintended preg-
nancy are so costy.3 13 Congress and some state legislatures are just
now considering ways to alleviate the unfair health burden caused by
insurers' failure to cover reversible contraception. Recently, Maryland
enacted legislation requiring insurers to provide contraceptive cover-
age to the same extent as other prescription drugs in its plan.3 1 4 Two
states have enacted mandates that require insurers to offer coverage
to employer health plans as an optional rider,315 and state-by-state ef-
forts to mandate contraceptive coverage are increasing.3 16 Further-
more, bills to mandate contraception coverage in those health care
plans offering prescription drug coverage have been introduced in
Congress and are pending.3 17
309. See Law, supra note 69, at 372-86.
310. See id. at 381.
311. See id. at 380 (citing Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. ll.
1994) and Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
312. See id. at 381 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1604 (1997) and Turic v. Holland
Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996)).
313. See Law, supra note 69, at 364-68 (describing impact of unintended
pregnancies on infant mortality and morbidity, financial cost, abortion, and socio-
economic status of women); Trussell, supra note 8.
314. See MD. CODE ANN., INS., § 15-826(b)(1) (1997 & Supp.); MD. CODE ANN.
HEALTH-GEN., § 19-796(i) (1996 Repl. & Supp.) (effective October 1, 1998, Md. H.B.
457, signed into law on April 28, 1998).
315. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 431:10A-116.6 (1997) (insurers must provide, as an
employer option, contraceptive services including any prescriptive drug or device ap-
proved by the FDA, to subscriber and dependents covered by the policy); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1998) (insurers "shall offer and make available" cover-
age for any prescription drug or device approved by the FDA).
316. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, States Acting to Expand Private Insurance Plans
Contraceptive Coverage, 8 STATE REPROD. HEALTH MONITOR (visited Mar. 1997) <http://
206.215.210.5/pubs/ournals/SRHM039704.html> (reporting on efforts in Connecti-
cut, Illinois, California, and Hawaii); New Bil; supra note 306. Recently, bills requiring
contraceptive coverage were introduced but have yet to succeed in the following
states: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wis-
consin. Search of Westlaw, BiLTRK database (July 7, 1998). Maryland enacted a cov-
erage mandate on April 28, 1998. See MD. CODE ANN., HEAItTH-GEN., supra note 314.
317. See generally Family Planning and Choice Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2525,
105th Cong. (1997); Contraceptive Services Covered Under Certain Plans, H.R. 2174,
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2. Sterilization
Surgical sterilization is the most common method of contracep-
tion employed in the United States, preferred by forty-two percent of
couples employing a birth control method;318 however, the perma-
nency of sterilization as a birth control method makes it an unaccept-
able method of birth control for couples only desiring to postpone
childbearing.3 19 Forty-two percent of couples opt for sterilization; of
those, females undergo tubal ligation 29.5% of the time, while men
undergo vasectomies 12.6% of the time.3 20 Both vasectomy and tubal
ligation are generally covered equally under insurance policies. Cov-
erage is far more common for this permanent method of contracep-
tion than for reversible methods of contraception,3 2' despite the fact
105th Cong. (1997); Coverage of Contraceptives and Contraceptive Drugs, S. 766,
105th Cong. (1997); Contraceptive Drugs and Devices Under Health Plans, S. 743,
105th Cong. (1997). See generally Government Press Releases, Snowe Announces Senate
Hearing to Address Inequities Between Men & Women in Prescription Coverage, July 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7325045; House Panel Approves Federal Insurance Coverage for Contra-
ceptives, AssOCIATD PRESS POL. SEv., June 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7424352;
Deborah Barfield, Washington Briefing, NEwSDAY, June 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL
2675768.
318. See Contraceptives, supra note 272. Law speculates that the preference for
irreversible sterilization may be an artifact of insurance coverage, since more plans
cover sterilization than reversible contraception. See Law, supra note 69, at 368-69.
319. See Law, supra note 69, at 369 & n.29 ("Many women, especially younger
women, who are sterilized come to regret their decision."). Moreover, tubal ligation
is not completely reliable and poses a risk for life-threatening ectopic (tubal)
pregnancies. See Peterson, et al., The Risk of Ectopic Pregnancy After Tubal Sterilization,
336 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 762, 762 (1997).
320. See Contraceptives, supra note 272.
321. Over 85% of all plan types cover both vasectomies and tubal ligation. See
UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 17-19.
Coverage was not always the norm. The poignant case of Price v. State Capital Life
Ins. Co., 134 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1964), is illustrative. There, the insured husband
sought coverage for his spouse's tubal ligation. See id. at 171. At issue was whether the
tubal ligation surgery was "as a result of accidental bodily injuries or sickness." Id. at
172. No one disputed that another pregnancy would have dire consequences:
He and his wife have four children between the ages of two and thirteen
years. Mrs. Price became increasingly depressed and disturbed emotionally
during each pregnancy after her first. During her fourth, she was emotion-
ally unstable throughout the entire pregnancy. She wept continuously, re-
quired drugs in order to sleep or eat, and remained in bed for most of the
nine months. She narrowly escaped a complete nervous breakdown. Mrs.
Price had twice been in a sanitarium for tuberculosis, the last time being
four or five months after the birth of her first child.
Id. at 172. Her physician testified that she suffered postpartum psychosis and severe
depression and that there was a danger another pregnancy would activate her ar-
rested tuberculosis. See id. The court concluded that a tubal ligation to prevent po-
tential disease was not covered (because it was preventative) but remanded for trial
on the grounds that the tubal ligation may have been needed to treat her mental
condition. See id. at 173. Cf Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Whitten, 88 So. 2d 573 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1956) (tubal ligation performed following serious hemorrhaging during past
pregnancies was preventative and no "existing illness" necessitated surgery).
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that reversible methods and sterilization serve populations with very
different reproductive needs.322
Although insurers favor coverage for surgical sterilization as a
contraceptive method over reversible methods, insurers widely refuse
to cover surgical reversal of elective sterilization for couples regretting
their previous decision. 323
Insurance companies are singularly unsympathetic to insureds
who change their minds, regardless of how compelling the story.3 24
The case of Mae Janell Shelton highlights the issue.3 25 Mae Shelton
and her first husband suffered incompatibility of Rh factor in their
blood.326 Following the birth of her first child, doctors advised that
the incompatibility of the blood would result in the fatality of any
later-conceived fetus, and she should undergo a tubal ligation to avoid
any future pregnancies. 327 Sixteen years later, Mae entered a second
marriage to a man with whom Rh incompatibility was not a factor.3 28
The health insurance policy in question covered "necessary care and
treatment of an injury or sickness."3 29 Applying general insurance
concepts of moral hazard,330 the court concluded that the initial elec-
tive surgery and its voluntary reversal constituted a moral hazard for
which there should be no insurance coverage. 33 ' A sharp dissent ar-
gued that Rh incompatibility was an ailment and the original decision
to undergo tubal ligation merely "trade[d] one illness [Rh incompati-
bility] for another [infertility]. '332
To argue that surgery to avoid complications from her Rh negative
factor was elective is preposterous. To argue further that the inabil-
ity to produce healthy, live born children does not somehow
322. Moreover, some will eventually regret the sterilization decision. See Lynne
S. Wilcox, et al., Risk Factors for Regret After Tubal Sterilization: 5 Years of Follow-Up In A
Prospective Study, 55 FERTILITy & STERiLrv 927, 932 (1991) (reporting on findings, in-
cluding that young age was the strongest predictor of regret).
323. See id.
324. See Reuss v. Time Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (denying
coverage to reverse vasectomy as neither an "injury or sickness" nor a "customary and
necessary" charge related to covered vasectomies); Marsh v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 516
So. 2d 1311, 1315 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (reversal of tubal ligation was not treatment of
an sickness and was specifically excluded as a procedure to reverse elective steriliza-
tion procedure); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 611 S.W.2d 928, 931-32
(Tex. App. 1981) (reversal of prior elective tubal ligation was not treatment for a
sickness under terms of policy).
325. See Shelton, 611 S.W.2d at 928-30.
326. See id. at 929.
327. See id. The first child of Rh incompatible couples usually does not present
difficulties because the mother has not yet produced antibodies to the blood of the
fetus. See id. at 932 (Spurlock, J., dissenting).
328. See id. at 929. She was also advised that medical advances could restore her
fallopian tubes. See id.
329. Id. at 920-30.
330. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
331. See Shelton, 611 S.W.2d at 932.
332. Id. at 933 (Spurlock, J., dissenting).
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demonstrate a serious impairment in a female body borders on the
far reaches of common sense. A primary ability of a healthy, nor-
mally functioning female is the ability to successfully bear
children.3 3 3
However, as the majority held, the voluntary nature of the conduct
involved constituted a moral hazard that would not be insured under
general principles of insurance law without an express inclusion by
the insurer.3 3 4
Couples regretting sterilization decisions find little sympathy
among insurers due to the elective nature of both the decision to un-
dergo sterilization and the decision to reverse sterilization. Curiously,
while both sterilization and its reversal are regarded as elective, insur-
ers voluntarily cover sterilization,3 3 5 presumably because sterilization
yields a cost benefit to the insurer.
C. Abortion
Over half of all pregnancies among American women are unin-
tended, and one-half of those unintended pregnancies are terminated
by surgical abortion;3 3 6 three percent of American women of repro-
ductive age undergo abortion in a given year.3 3 7 An estimated forty-
three percent of women will have an abortion by the end of their re-
productive years.3 38 Most surgical abortions are performed in the first
trimester when cost and safety are most favorable.3 3 9 The death rate
for surgical abortions is 0.2 deaths per 100,000 procedures at or
before the eighth week, increasing to two per 100,000 at thirteen to
fifteen weeks.3 40
Curiously, the presence of private or public funding has little im-
pact on abortion decisions,3 41 diminishing a moral hazard argument
against coverage. However, the lack of insurance or public funding
for abortion may have detrimental health and economic conse-
333. See id.
334. See id. at 931 (noting also that pregnancy and childbirth are moral hazards
covered only if expressly included in the insurance policy).
335. See generally supra note 321 and accompanying text.
336. See Abortion, supra note 293. Currently, RU 486, a medical (not surgical)
abortion alternative has not been approved in the United States. See Michele Lynn
Lakomy, A Meaningful Choice: Two FDA Approved Drugs Are Combined to Perform Medical
Abortions, 18 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 49, 49-50 (1996). However, a legal medical alterna-
tive involving the off-label use of two FDA approved drugs is now available. See id.
337. See Abortion, supra note 293.
338. See id.
339. See id. See also Lakomy, supra note 336, at 52-53.
340. See Lakomy, supra note 336, at 54.
341. See Susan Randall, Health Care Reform and Abortion, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
58, 66 (1994); Millsap, supra note 71, at 55.
1998]
WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
quences as a lack of financial resources may lead to dangerous delays
in securing an abortion.342
Approximately two-thirds of all types of insurance plans routinely
cover induced abortions.3 43 An estimated twenty percent of the re-
maining plans cover abortions in some restricted fashion, while about
ten percent exclude abortion procedures entirely.34 Insurer deci-
sions to cover abortions are voluntary, as the PDA expressly provides
that declining coverage for abortion is not discriminatory.3 45
Abortion is a politically-charged issue, and therefore, state and
federal mandates to increase coverage for abortion are extremely un-
likely. Instead, legislative action and public attitudes pose a threat to
abortion coverage at this time.3 46 Unlike other health coverage man-
dates, government mandates in the abortion arena usually limit rather
than expand elective abortion coverage. For example, a few states
prohibit inclusion of abortion coverage as part of the standard insur-
ance policy and allow coverage for elective abortions only by way of an
optional rider.347 Pennsylvania requires insurers to provide a choice
as to coverage by offering policies both with and without express abor-
tion coverage. 348 These statutes allow employers purchasing insur-
ance for employees substantial influence over the reproductive health
342. See Randall, supra note 341, at 69 (citing Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S.
Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Services for the Poor, 16 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 170,
178-79 (1984)).
343. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 19. The breakdown by type of plan
is: 66% of large group fee-for-service plans, 67% of PPOs, 83% of POS networks and
70% of HMOs. See id. See also Randall, supra note 341, at 63.
344. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 19.
345. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
346. See Randall, supra note 341, at 63-64. Public controversy and criticism also
threatens the availability of abortion services; fewer physicians are now trained to per-
form abortion and there has been a decline in the number of abortion providers over
time. See Lakomy, supra note 336, at 53, 64. Only approximately 34% of gynecologists
perform surgical abortions. See id. at 53. See also Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called "Par-
tial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV.
301, 308-10 (1998) (describing and criticizing federal and state efforts to ban late
term, dilation and extraction abortion method).
347. See Randall, supra note 341, at 63-64 (noting that six states currently limit
coverage except by optional rider with additional premium or some other restric-
tion). See, e.g. IDAHO CODE § 41-2210A (1997); Ky. REV. STAr. ANN. § 304.5-160
(1997); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376a.805(1) (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-03 (1997);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-18-28 (1997) (reenacted following determination of unconstitu-
tionality in Nat'lEduc. Ass'n v. Garrahy, 598 F. Supp. 1374 (D.R.I. 1984), affd 779 F.2d
790 (1st Cir. 1986)). See Coe v. Melahn, 958 F.2d 223, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1992) (op-
tional rider provision in Missouri statute does not impose an undue burden on abor-
tion decision but whether it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
remains a question of fact).
348. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(e) (West 1997).
[Vol. 13:119
SEX SEXUAL PLEASURE, AND REPRODUCTION
decisions of their employees. 349 Other states limit abortion coverage
for public employees under their employer plans. 350
If health reform occurs at the federal level, the relatively gener-
ous coverage by private insurers may be threatened by federal interfer-
ence.351  Currently, federally-paid insurance plans for public
employees and dependents do not cover abortion except in instances
to save the life of the mother, or when pregnancy is the result of rape
or incest.3
52
Federal opposition to public funding for abortion creates a vast
difference between private insurance and Medicaid coverage for abor-
tions. Under the Hyde Amendment, federal money may not be spent
on abortion except in very limited circumstances.35 3 Although state
Medicaid programs may fund abortion using nonfederal money, the
majority of states do not provide state assistance.354
349. See Havighurst, supra note 10, at 1767 & n.27 (noting that employers are not
always looking out for employees when negotiating the insurance contract).
350. See Randall, supra note 341, at 64. An Alan Guttmacher survey in May 1998,
reports that nine states preclude insurance coverage for public employees (Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Virginia). See AGI, THE STATUS OF MAJOR ABORTION-RELATED LAVS IN THE STATES (vis-
ited July 20, 1998) <http://v.agi-usa.org/pubs/abort_law.status.html>.
351. See Randall, supra note 341, at 67.
352. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act
for FiscalYear 1998, PUB. L. No. 105-61, § 513, 111 STAT. 1272, 1305 (1997). Like the
Hyde Amendment, the prohibition is added to an appropriation bill and is not per-
manent law; consequently the provision may vary from year to year. See Randall, supra
note 341, at 64 & n.29 (noting that appropriations in fiscal year 1994 did not contain
a rape and incest provision). CHAMPUS prohibits abortion coverage except to save -
the life of the mother. See 32 C.F.1 § 199.4(e) (2) (1998).
353. Under the Hyde Amendment, a section reenacted each year within the De-
partment of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act, federal money provided
to fund state Medicaid programs may not be used to fund abortion services except in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, PUB. L. No. 105-78, § 509,
111 STAT. 1467, 1516 (1997). In fiscal year 1998, public money could not be used to
fund abortion except in the case of "rape or incest" or "where a woman suffers from a
physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering
physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as certi-
fied by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is per-
formed." Id. at § 510 (a) (1)-(2). The Hyde Amendment differs from year-to-year, in
previous years abortion coverage has been limited to life-saving necessity. See Dalton
v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 116 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (1996) ("The Hyde
Amendment is not permanent legislation" and different versions of it have been en-
acted from time to time); Randall, supra note 341, at 65 & n.44 (discussing various
Hyde Amendments).
354. States may voluntarily provide coverage using nonfederal funds. See PUB. L.
No. 105-78 § 510 (b), supra note 353. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute,
only seventeen states fund some abortion services with state funds. See Status of Major
Abortion-Related Laws in the States, supra note 350 (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia). See generally
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION FACT SHEETS: STATE LAWvS RESTRICTING AccEss TO
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V. COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY
When a couple is unable to conceive a child, the psychological
pain is significant, and the impact of the diagnosis often pervades
daily life, work, marriage, and relationships with others.35 5 Infertility
affects fifteen percent of couples over the reproductive lifetime of the
female partner.3 56 Male factors contribute at least forty percent to
fifty percent of the time.357 At any given time, one to 1.5% of women
of reproductive age seek infertility care. 358
Insurers often cover some of the less costly diagnostic tests and
treatments, while denying coverage for more expensive assisted repro-
ductive technologies through express exclusions.3 59 Expenses related
to diagnosing and treating infertility vary because of the wide range of
causes.5 60 Diagnosis is complex, and the tests and procedures needed
ABORTION 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V. WADE (visited July 22, 1998) <http://www.planned
parenthood.org/library/ABORTION/StateLaws.html>. See also Dalton, 116 S. Ct. at
1064-65 (1996).
355. See Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, 18J. LEGAL MED. 265,
270-71 (1997) (discussing psychological impact); Cole, supra note 113, at 732-33 (dis-
cussing "devastating effect"); Rhonda S. Tishcler, Comment, Infertility: A Forgotten Disa-
bility, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 249, 251-52 (1994) (discussing "terrible emotional and
physical toll"); LindaJ. Lacey, 0 Wind, Remind Him That I Have No Child: Infertility and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 167-68 (1998) (describing desire to
have children).
356. See Arnold Cohen, Managed Health Care's Approach to Infertility, 9 IINFERTILriY
AND REPROD. MED. CLINICS OF N. Am. 21, 21 (1998).
357. See Manoj Monga & Wayne J.G. Hellstrom, Many Paths to Medical Therapy for
Male Infertility, CoNTEMP. UROLOGY, Sept. 1996, at 23, 47 (reviewing studies of hormo-
nal and nonhormonal treatments of male infertility and noting that no medication
has been specifically approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of
male infertility). Surgical treatment for certain male conditions may be appropriate.
See Larry Lipshultz, et al., Reproductive Microsurgery: Alternatives and Obstacles, CONTEMP.
UROLOGY, June 1996, at 15, 15.
358. See Cohen, supra note 356, at 21.
359. Coverage for infertility varies and depends on the therapeutic service
sought.
Sixty-one percent of large-group plans, 57% of PPOs, 66% of POS net-
works and 91% of HMOs routinely cover semen analysis in their typical pol-
icy. Endometrial biopsy is covered by 76% of large-group plans, 73% of
PPOs, 78% of POS networks and 90% of HMOs.
Clomid, a prescription drug widely used to treat infertility in women, is
routinely covered by 40% of large-group plans and PPOs and 48% of POS
networks and 67% of HMOs ....
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is rarely covered, regardless of the type of
plan. IVF is routinely covered by 14% of large-group plans, 16% of PPOs
and 17% of POS networks and HMOs.
UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 22, 26. But cf. Christine Gorman, Playing the
HMO Game, TIME, July 13, 1998, at 26 (reporting that an increasing number of large
employer-sponsored HMO plans are covering in vitro fertilization).
360. See Edward Zbella, The Physician's View of Managed Care in Reproductive
Medicine, 9 INFERTILITY AND REPROD. MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 1, 8 (1998); O'Rourke,
supra note 113, at 347-53; OFFIcE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-358
INFERTILITY- MED. AND Soc. CHOICES 139-44 (1988) [hereinafter OTA].
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to confirm infertility can be expensive.3 61 Once diagnosed, numer-
ous therapies may be attempted to treat infertility, including hormo-
nal therapy, drug therapy, and surgery. Coverage for these treatments
is variable, with insurers picking up approximately seventy percent of
the costs other than the assisted reproductive technologies.3 62
When the underlying infertility cannot be treated, patients may
desire assisted reproductive technologies to aid in fertilization and
conception.3 63 These therapies3 64 are costly, but only three percent of
361. See Zbella, supra note 360, at 8 (describing coverage for diagnostic proce-
dures under AETNA). The infertility workup may include: confirmation of inability
to conceive despite six months of unprotected sex, physical exam, evaluation of ovula-
tion, semen analysis, endocrinological examination, endometrial biopsies at timed in-
tervals, hysterosalpingography, laparoscopy, hysteroscopy, and ultrasonography. See
O'Rourke, supra note 113, at 350-51 (describing varied causes of infertility); Cole,
supra note 113, at 734-35 ("average cost per couple for infertility treatment, including
IVF, is actually estimated to be very low, at $200 per couple").
In 1988, the Office of Technology Assessment, undertook a comprehensive ex-
amination of infertility, including a survey of costs for various diagnostic procedures
and treatments. See OTA, supra note 360, at 139-62.
362. The Office of Technology Assessment found that non-IVF insurance cover-
age approximated 70%, individuals paid 22%, and other sources covered the remain-
der. See OTA, supra note 360, at 148-49. However, "It] he majority of health insurance
plans and health maintenance organizations exclude specific coverage for IVF." Id. at
153. See also Solomon Leftin, Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments and Procedures,
19 COLO. LAw. 663, 663-64 (1990) (noting that initial diagnostic testing generally
costs about $5,000); Tischler, supra note 355, at 254-55.
However, some insurers take the position that infertility treatment is not covered
because it is not medically necessary. For example, in Thomas v. Truck Drivers and
Helpers Local No. 335, Health and Welfare Fund/Pension Fund, 771 F. Supp. 714, 714 (D.
Md. 1991), the insured sought coverage for a bilateral vasoepidiymostomy to clear an
obstruction of the epididymis that prevented his fertility. The plan provided coverage
for specific operations and also covered other medical expenses in its discretion that
were not expressly excluded. See id. at 715. The plan excluded "[e]xpenses not con-
nected with the care and treatment of an actual injury or sickness." Id. The insurer
contended the surgery was not medically necessary because the insured sought the
treatment to impregnate his wife. See id. The court found the plan's determination
not to cover the treatment was not an abuse of its reserved discretion. See id. at 716-
17.
Aetna reports that the average infertile patient care costs are between $1,000-
$4355 without assisted reproductive technologies. See Cohen, supra note 356, at 22.
In Massachusetts, where infertility care is mandated, the cost, with assisted reproduc-
tive technologies for a successful pregnancy is $39,375, other estimates range from
$60,000 to $800,000 per successful pregnancy. See id. (footnotes omitted). See also
Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogies, 13 SANrA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 517, 530-31 (1997) ($8-12,000 per
IVF cycle).
363. See O'Rourke, supra note 113, at 353.
364. O'Rourke identifies and describes the following assisted reproductive tech-
nology therapies: artificial insemination by husband, artificial insemination by donor,
in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), Pro-Nuclear Stage
Transfer (PROST), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), tubal embryo transfer
(TET), and natural cycle ovum retrieval intravaginal fertilization (NORIF). See
O'Rourke, supra note 113, passim.
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Americans pursuing infertility treatment actually seek the more costly
assisted reproductive technologies. 365 Importantly, the relatively low
demand for assisted reproductive technologies suggests providing cov-
erage for infertility would not adversely affect insurance premiums. 366
State legislatures began to mandate coverage for infertility serv-
ices in the 1980s, as infertile couples attempted to overcome the ex-
press exclusions springing up in health insurance policies.3 67 Twelve
states either mandate coverage or mandate that insurers offer cover-
age for assisted reproductive technologies.368
The methods insurers use to avoid coverage under the insurance
contract include express exclusions, and arguments that assisted re-
productive technologies are not medically necessary, are experimen-
tal, or do not treat a disease. 369 Insurers are adverse to covering
365. See Neumann, supra note 52, at 1220-21. In vitro costs approximately
$10,500 per cycle. See id. at 1221. When the success rate (about 15% on first attempt)
is considered, the cost of per in vitro delivery is estimated at between $66,667 (on first
cycle) to $114,286 (on sixth cycle). See id. at 1222.
366. See Cole, supra note 113, at 734-36; OTA, supra note 360, at 155. Neumann
points out:
It is important to note that even with large utilization increases [as a result of
coverage], health insurance premiums would likely not increase very much
with coverage, because the fraction of couples in the population who use IVF
services is small. Only about 3 percent (or fewer than 50,000) of Americans
who seek treatment for infertility each year receive rVF. Collins . . . esti-
mated that even if utilization rose 300 percent as a result of adding 1VF serv-
ices to a typical employer health plan, average premiums per employee
would only rise about $9 per year. Another group previously estimated that
in 1990, VF would have added under a dollar to annual premiums, as op-
posed to $7 for chiropractic services and $26 for alcoholic and psychiatric
services.
Neumann, supa note 52, at 1220-21 (references omitted). Others report that cover-
age experiences have ranged from $.60 per person per month to $1.70. See Tischler,
supra note 355, at 255-56; OTA reported that Delaware Blue Cross/Blue Shield's vol-
untary coverage of IVF and other infertility services resulted in a $.60 cost per person
per month and in Maryland the cost amounted to $1.06 per household per month.
See OTA, supra note 360, at 155.
367. Neumann notes a slowing in the trend of the 1980s among states to man-
date coverage. See Neumann, supra note 52, at 1226.
368. See AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, STATE INFERrLrIY INSUR-
ANCE LAws (visited June 19, 1998) <http://vvv.asrm.org/patient/insur.html>; Neu-
mann, supra note 52, at 1218 (discussing state laws); Cole, supra note 113, at 724-27
(discussing state laws); Tischler, supra note 355, at 258-62 (discussing state laws);
Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARVARD L. REv. 2092,
2097-99 (1996).
369. See Cole, supra note 113, at 719-723 (discussing case law); Bonny Gilbert,
Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, 63 DEF. COUNS.
J. 42, 44-46 (1996) (discussing case law).
For notable cases covering infertility treatment or finding sufficient dispute to
send for trial, see Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 900 F.2d 1032,
1036-38 (7th Cir. 1990) (infertility is an illness under the policy and in vitro is treat-
ment even though it will not cure the underlying disease); Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F.2d 416, 423-24 (7th Cir.) (reversing summary judg-
ment for insurer; material question of fact whether insurer acted arbitrarily in deny-
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assisted reproductive technologies in part because they view such
treatment as a moral hazard: First, the decision to have a child is a
personal choice within the control of the individual; second, insurers
view unrealistically desperate infertile couples as driven to overuse the
assisted reproductive technologies despite a relatively low success rate
associated with the treatment.370
VI. CONCLUSION: IT Is Tim:E To REwgrrE THE INSURANCE CoNTRAcr
Insurance coverage for sexual and reproductive health is both
piecemeal and irrational. The insurer preference to cover disease and
surgery over health maintenance and prevention means that the typi-
cal health insurance contract is inadequate to meet our sexual and
reproductive health needs. The pervasive reliance on express exclu-
sions to avoid covering matters of sexual and reproductive health sug-
gests that insurers do not regard sexual and reproductive health as
basic health care. However, both consumer studies and the evidence
of high demand for sexual and reproductive health care services sug-
gest that consumers need and want coverage for their sexual and re-
productive health needs.371 Demanding that insurers cover sexual
and reproductive health care is not demanding "cadillac" coverage;
rather, sexual and reproductive health care should be fundamental to
a basic health insurance contract.372
Because insurers are out-of-step with consumers, consumers are
turning to the legislative process to assist in negotiating better insur-
ance contracts. However, state and federal mandates offer a poor so-
lution to changing the insurance coverage landscape for several
reasons. First, state mandates do not impact a large segment of health
plans such as those of federally-funded plans for government workers
or Medicare recipients, as well as ERISA self-insured plans. Second, as
the abortion debate demonstrates, both federal and state mandates
may target particular procedures for exclusion, thus making the pri-
vate insurance contract subject to political winds. State and federal
ing benefits because it considered in vitro experimental), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856
(1988); Witcraft v. Sunstrand Health and Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785,
788-90 (Iowa 1988) (infertility is a disease and covering artificial insemination where
infertility is due to irregular ovulation and low sperm count); Ralston v. Connecticut
GeneralLife Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 1379, 1381-82 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd and remanded 625 So.
2d 156 (La. 1993) (reversingjudgment in favor of insureds and remanding for trial to
determine whether in vitro was treatment for a sickness and was medically necessary).
For a notable case denying coverage, see Kinzie v. Physician's Liability Insurance Com-
pany, 750 P.2d 1140, 114243 (Okla. 1987) (in vitro was not medically necessary be-
cause in vitro did not treat the infertile condition).
370. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 114.
371. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 25. See also supra note 60.
372. See Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Health Insurance
to Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 188 (1994)
(proposing "cadillac" and "chevrolet" health plans, not based on exclusions, but on
budgeted risk preferences).
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mandates are a double-edged sword when it comes to seeking sexual
and reproductive health coverage. Third, because employers, not in-
dividuals, negotiate most insurance contracts, mandates that merely
require insurers to offer coverage to employers give insureds limited
choice, at best. Finally, mandates do not necessarily reflect rational
medical priorities, but rather the popular disease or treatment of the
day.3 73
There are a variety of explanations for insurer resistance to repro-
ductive and sexual health care coverage. In some cases, as in coverage
for Viagra or contraception, insurers deny coverage as they fear the
excessive and uncontainable demand. Indeed, because of our sexual
nature, treatment for sexual and reproductive health services are
often highly demanded; however, the need is basic and important,
and does not justify insurers' evasion of coverage. If, as in the case of
Viagra, insurers fear the vagaries of diagnosis and abuse, then the so-
lution should be developing external controls and well-articulated
standards rather than denying coverage altogether for legitimate
claims.
Insurers correctly recognize that sexual and reproductive activity
is voluntary, and insureds possess an ability to create claims. Human
activity is largely voluntary, yet insurers nevertheless cover the health
risks associated with nonsexual human activity in general. Further-
more, insurers probably overestimate the effect of insurance on sexual
and reproductive health care choices because significant external con-
trols, such as the pain and discomfort of treatment, nonmedical costs,
and favorable and unfavorable social and emotional consequences
drive decision-making. Moreover, the fear of overutilization does not
justify excluding coverage for necessary, basic sexual and reproductive
health care. Instead, insurers have a responsibility to participate in
developing effective controls such as standards of care, diagnostic cri-
teria, and appropriate patient management.
At the heart of the patchwork of coverage and exclusions for mat-
ters of sexual and reproductive health, remains the fact that insurance
coverage is rooted in value-laden principles viewing sexuality as repug-
nant and immoral. Insurers should shed out-dated values, accept our
sexual nature, and provide Americans with basic sexual and reproduc-
tive health care. Insurers must acknowledge that insureds are not
373. SeeJERRY, supra note 129, at 437-40 (discussing impact of state mandates and
noting that they often reflect political power and influence rather than sound health
policy); Dan Wascoe, Legislators Often Answer Call To Mandate Health Care, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 18, 1996, at B1 (noting the increasing popularity of state
mandates, commenting that Minnesota has 30 state mandates including among
others, coverage of hair pieces following cancer treatments, removal of birthmarks,
bone marrow transplants for breast cancer); Cole, supra note 113, at 734 (noting wide
range of insurance mandates in California); O'Rourke, supra note 113, at 386 &
n.414.
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asexual, and consumers expect coverage for this important aspect of
their overall health.

